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Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality
NEIL M. RICHARDS* & DANIEL J. SOLOVE**
The familiar legend of privacy law holds that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
“invented” the right to privacy in 1890, and that William Prosser aided its development by recognizing four privacy torts in 1960. In this Article, Professors Richards
and Solove contend that Warren, Brandeis, and Prosser did not invent privacy law,
but took it down a new path. Well before 1890, a considerable body of AngloAmerican law protected confidentiality, which safeguards the information people
share with others. Warren, Brandeis, and later Prosser turned away from the law of
confidentiality to create a new conception of privacy based on the individual’s
“inviolate personality.” English law, however, rejected Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy and developed a conception of privacy as confidentiality from the
same sources used by Warren and Brandeis. Today, in contrast to the individualistic
conception of privacy in American law, the English law of confidence recognizes and
enforces expectations of trust within relationships. Richards and Solove explore how
and why privacy law developed so differently in America and England. Understanding the origins and developments of privacy law’s divergent paths reveals that each
body of law’s conception of privacy has much to teach the other.
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C.

PRIVACY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN

CONTRASTING CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY

INTRODUCTION
According to the oft-told legend, the right to privacy was born when Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis penned The Right to Privacy in 1890.1 Spanning
just twenty-eight pages in the Harvard Law Review, the article identified
privacy as an implicit concept running throughout Anglo-American common
law. Commentators have hailed the article as the “most influential law review
article of all”2 and “one of the most brilliant excursions in the field of theoretical jurisprudence.”3 Countless others have agreed.4 In addition to giving birth to
four privacy torts, the article structured the conceptual landscape of privacy
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
3. Elbridge L. Adams, The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REV. 37,
37 (1905).
4. P. ALLAN DIONISOPOULOS & CRAIG R. DUCAT, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: ESSAYS AND CASES 20 (1976)
(The Right to Privacy is “perhaps the most influential law journal piece ever published”); William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (The Right to Privacy is an “outstanding example of
the influence of legal periodicals upon the American law”).
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more generally, shaping the development of statutory, constitutional, and other
privacy protections.5
The conventional wisdom, shared by both admirers and critics alike, is that
Warren and Brandeis constructed a right to privacy out of a very meager body
of law. Indeed, Warren and Brandeis have been hailed as the “inventors” of the
right to privacy.6 As Roscoe Pound noted, they did “nothing less than add a
chapter to our law.”7 Before their article, the conventional wisdom goes, the law
did little to establish a firm foundation for the protection of privacy. With
brilliant maneuvering of limited precedent, Warren and Brandeis achieved the
legal equivalent of pulling a rabbit out of a hat.8
The conventional wisdom, however, is wrong. In this Article, we argue that
Warren and Brandeis did not invent the right to privacy from a negligible body
of precedent but instead charted a new path for American privacy law. By 1890,
a robust body of confidentiality law protecting private information from disclosure existed throughout the Anglo-American common law. Confidentiality focuses on relationships; it involves trusting others to refrain from revealing
personal information to unauthorized individuals.9 Rather than protecting the
information we hide away in secrecy, confidentiality protects the information
we share with others based upon our expectations of trust and reliance in
relationships. Building upon the confidentiality case of Prince Albert v. Strange,10
Warren and Brandeis pointed American common law in a new direction, toward
a more general protection of “inviolate personality” against invasions by strangers. The celebrated torts scholar William Prosser cemented this change of

5. As one commentator has observed, Warren and Brandeis’s article “has attained what some might
call legendary status” and has been a “seminal force in the development of a ‘right to privacy’ in
American law.” Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of the
Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002).
6. See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 877 (1979) (there is “near
unanimity among courts and commentators that the Warren-Brandeis conceptualization created the
structural and jurisprudential foundation of the tort of invasion of privacy”); Ruth Gavison, Too Early
for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis Were Right on Privacy vs. Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437, 438
(1992) (Warren and Brandeis “single-handedly created a tort”); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy
Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703–04 (1990).
7. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 70 (1946) (quoting Roscoe Pound).
8. See, e.g., WALTER F. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 19–37 (1979); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 966–72 (1964) (arguing
that although Warren and Brandeis’s right to privacy expressly differentiated itself from existing
doctrines such as defamation, property, and emotional distress, they actually “went very little beyond
. . . giving ‘their right’ and ‘their interest’ a name and distinguishing it from other rights or interests. It
is only in asides of characterization and passing attempts at finding a verbal equivalent of the principle
of privacy that we may find any further clues to the interest or value they sought to protect”); Robert C.
Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
647, 655 (1991); Walter F. Pratt, The Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right to Privacy, 1975 PUB.
L. 161.
9. See Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1137–38 (2006);
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 526–29 (2005).
10. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch.).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=969495

126

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:123

direction in his 1960 article, Privacy,11 and in the Second Restatement of Torts,
for which he served as a reporter. Prosser not only established American privacy
law as four related torts, but also minimized the importance of confidentiality as
a concept in American law. By contrast, English law developed a flexible and
powerful law of confidentiality from Prince Albert v. Strange, the very same
case underpinning Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy.
Thus far, the story of this fork in the path of privacy law has remained
largely unexplored, yet it has had far-reaching effects on the law on both
sides of the Atlantic. What the law of privacy protects and does not protect
today traces back in large part to this critical divergence in the evolution of
the common law of information disclosure. In America, four privacy torts
emerged from Warren and Brandeis’s article—public disclosure of private
facts, intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, and false
light.12 English courts repeatedly considered whether to adopt the four
privacy torts spawned by Warren and Brandeis and consistently refused to
do so.13 However, the English law of confidentiality has expanded to redress
some (though not all) of the injuries protected by the Warren and Brandeis
torts.
The law of confidentiality in England also has attributes that the American
privacy torts lack. In America, the prevailing belief is that people assume
the risk of betrayal when they share secrets with each other. But in England,
spouses, ex-spouses, friends, and nearly anyone else can be liable for
divulging confidences.14 As one English court noted, “when people kiss and
later one of them tells, that second person is almost certainly breaking a
confidential arrangement.”15 Confidentiality thus recognizes that nondisclosure expectations emerge not only from norms of individual dignity, but also
from norms of relationships, trust, and reliance on promises. American
privacy law has never fully embraced privacy within relationships; it typically views information exposed to others as no longer private. Although a
tort remedying breach of confidence would emerge later on in American law,
it developed slowly in comparison to the Warren and Brandeis privacy
torts.
In this Article, we examine why American and English privacy law split apart
in the twentieth century and analyze the consequences of this divergence on
both sides of the Atlantic. Although there is some scholarship discussing the
Warren and Brandeis article itself, the complete story of the development of the
right to privacy in the common law has been neglected in the literature. By
11. Prosser, supra note 4.
12. Id. at 389.
13. See, e.g., Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62, 66 (C.A.) (U.K.).
14. See, e.g., Barrymore v. News Group Newspapers, [1997] F.S.R. 600 (Ch.) (U.K.) (lover liable for
breach of confidence); Stephens v. Avery, (1988) 1 Ch. 449 (U.K.) (friend liable for breach of
confidence); Argyll v. Argyll, (1967) 1 Ch. 302 (U.K.) (spouse liable for breach of confidence).
15. Barrymore, [1997] F.S.R. at 601.
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revisiting the history, we reveal that the common law of privacy did not unfold
according to one path, but two. While American privacy law has centered
around the individual’s inviolate personality, English privacy law has focused
on social relationships. Each body of privacy law has attributes that the other
lacks, and English and American conceptions of privacy have much to learn
from each other.
Moreover, our findings complicate existing understandings of privacy law
in the Western legal canon. In a recent article, James Whitman contrasts two
“western cultures of privacy,” an American tradition of liberty rooted in the
protection of the home and a European tradition of dignity rooted in
protection of feelings, which Warren and Brandeis’s theory introduced into
American law.16 Our examination of the history reveals that the law of
privacy in the West is far more complex than a dichotomy between liberty
and dignity. Confidentiality represents a third understanding of privacy, one
with firm foundations in both American and English jurisprudence. For all
their differences, conceptions of privacy based on liberty and dignity often
have been highly individualistic. Confidentiality, in contrast, is a significantly different conception of privacy—one based on the protection of
relationships.
In Part I, we debunk the myths surrounding the birth of the right to privacy
by discussing the extensive law protecting privacy as confidentiality that existed
prior to Warren and Brandeis’s article. In Part II, we examine the divergent
paths of privacy and confidentiality law in America and England in the aftermath of Warren and Brandeis’s momentous article, and we discuss the profound
consequences of these developments.
I. PRIVACY’S DEFINING MOMENT
According to the legend surrounding the Warren and Brandeis article, there
was scant law on the books to protect privacy until Warren and Brandeis pieced
together various fragments of law to create a robust right to privacy. This
legend, however, is myth.
Warren and Brandeis did not give birth to the right to privacy; they shifted
its conceptual underpinnings away from confidentiality and toward what
they called “inviolate personality.” By 1890, a rich body of law had developed to protect privacy as confidentiality. Its very existence at the time
Warren and Brandeis wrote their article has been virtually ignored. Warren
and Brandeis gave some recognition to this body of law, but their project
attempted to steer the law toward protecting what they believed to be a
broader conception of privacy. The then-flourishing law of confidentiality
became stunted in its development. In this Part, we tell the story that has

16. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J.
1151 (2004).
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become obscured by the lore surrounding Warren and Brandeis’s article.
A. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND INVIOLATE PERSONALITY

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their famous article, The Right
to Privacy, in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. The two men had met at
Harvard Law School. Brandeis was from Kentucky, the child of Jewish immigrants who prospered as the result of a Louisville grain business,17 while
Warren came from a wealthy and prominent Boston family.18 They finished law
school with Brandeis ranked first in the class and Warren second, and a few
years later, they started a law firm together.19 Brandeis was one of the original
founders of the Harvard Law Review in 1887, and he and Warren co-authored
three articles in early volumes. The Right to Privacy was their third article, and
it became the most famous product of their collaboration—hardly a surprise
since their first two articles were about the obscure topic of pond law.20 Their
article would forever change the intellectual landscape of American privacy law.
Warren and Brandeis framed their article around the intersection of the news
media and new technology. The newspaper industry was undergoing an amazing growth during the second half of the nineteenth century. Between 1850 and
1890, the number of newspapers increased from 100 to 900, and the number of
readers grew from approximately 800,000 to more than 8 million.21 Warren and
Brandeis complained that journalism had become sensationalistic and that the
“press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”22 Indeed,
the private papers of the two men suggest that perceived press invasions into the
“social privacy” of Brahmin families like the Warrens prompted Warren to
enlist his friend Brandeis in the project.23
Warren and Brandeis were particularly concerned about the new technology
of “[i]nstantaneous photograph[y.]”24 In 1884, the Eastman Kodak Company
produced the “snap camera,” a small inexpensive camera that the general public
could afford. Before the snap camera, cameras had been expensive and heavy;
they had to be set up and people would have to pose to have pictures taken. The
snap camera enabled people to take candid pictures and created a “craze” for
17. MASON, supra note 7, at 23–25; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
TRADITION 2 (1981).
18. DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
21 (1972).
19. Id. at 22.
20. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1889);
Samuel D. Warren, Jr. & Louis D. Brandeis, The Watuppa Pond Cases, 2 HARV. L. REV. 195 (1888).
21. See GINI GRAHAM SCOTT, MIND YOUR OWN BUSINESS: THE BATTLE FOR PERSONAL PRIVACY 37–38
(1995).
22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
23. See PEMBER, supra note 18, at 24–25.
24. Id. at 25.
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amateur photography by thousands of people who had previously not been able
to afford a camera.25
These developments prompted Warren and Brandeis to search for a legal
right to protect individual privacy. “It is our purpose,” the authors wrote, “to
consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be
invoked to protect the privacy of the individual; and, if it does, what the nature
and extent of such protection is.”26 Warren and Brandeis contended that the law
currently did not provide sufficient protection to privacy, but they demonstrated
how a right to privacy could be derived using common law reasoning.
In making this argument, Warren and Brandeis faced at least two practical
and theoretical challenges. First, there was a paucity of legal support for their
claims.27 Although the law protected somewhat related concepts such as breach
of confidence, trespass, and defamation, it did not protect against strangers
taking unauthorized photographs or disclosing true private facts about a person.
The second problem that Warren and Brandeis faced was remedial. Late nineteenth-century law was deeply reluctant to protect injury to emotions or feelings, preferring to grant remedies to more quantifiable harms, such as injury to
one’s property or physical person.28 Warren and Brandeis attempted to solve
each of these problems by creative readings of Judge Thomas Cooley’s seminal
torts treatise and the famous English case of Prince Albert v. Strange.
Warren and Brandeis famously asserted that the common law “secures to
each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”29 This right “is
merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone.”30 Warren and Brandeis adopted the “right to be let
alone” language from Cooley’s 1888 treatise The Law of Torts.31 Cooley was
one of the leading jurists of his day,32 a justice of the Michigan Supreme Court

25. Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the Right of Privacy in
New York, 1885–1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28 (1991).
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 197.
27. See PRATT, supra note 8, at 19–37.
28. See e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 105–06 (expanded
ed. 2003); Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History,
88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816 (1990); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 140–41
(1992).
29. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 198.
30. Id. at 205.
31. Id. at 195 & n.4 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)). The first
edition of Cooley’s torts treatise in 1880 also contained the phrase. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF
TORTS 29 (1st ed. 1880) [hereinafter COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS FIRST EDITION].
32. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM
102–05 (2000) (discussing Cooley’s influence on constitutional theory); WHITE, supra note 28, at 115
(noting that Cooley was one of a handful of judges who contributed to the intellectual history of torts
and that his torts treatise was “widely cited”).
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and the author of the principal treatises on constitutional law and torts.33
Cooley’s “right to be let alone” was merely a passing phrase in a discussion of
why tort law protected against not only batteries but also assaults with no
physical contact. Cooley noted that in assaults, victims suffered “a shock to the
nerves, and the peace and quiet of the individual is disturbed for a period of
greater or lesser duration.”34 Warren and Brandeis certainly found useful Cooley’s
recognition of mental injury as a basis for tort recovery, but Cooley’s usage of
“the right to be let alone” was fleeting and had no connection to privacy rights.
By contrast, Cooley devoted an entire chapter of the same treatise to the law of
“confidential relations,” but Warren and Brandeis did not discuss it.35
Warren and Brandeis also based much of their argument for a right to privacy
upon Prince Albert v. Strange, an English case from 1848.36 Prince Albert was a
famous confidentiality and literary property case that Warren and Brandeis
artfully (and perhaps disingenuously) recharacterized as a privacy case. The
dispute arose when Queen Victoria and her husband Albert, the Prince Consort,
sued in equity to prevent the exhibition by William Strange of etchings that the
royal couple had made of their family. They intended the etchings to be shared
only with their family and close friends. In addition to the etchings, the Royal
Family sought to prevent the publication of a descriptive catalog of the exhibit.
Strange apparently obtained the plates with which to make copies of the
etchings from an assistant to the palace printer who had provided them to him
“in violation of the confidence reposed in him.”37 In ruling for the Queen and
the Prince, Vice Chancellor Bruce suggested in dictum that a catalog of the
etchings could “shew the bent and turn of the mind, the feelings and taste of the
artist.”38 Bruce went on to suggest that “[a] man may employ himself in private
in a manner very harmless, but which, disclosed to society, may destroy the
comfort of his life, or even his success in it.”39 On appeal, the Lord Chancellor
agreed that Strange had no right to print and sell the etchings or the catalog. The
Chancellor concluded that Prince Albert had a common law literary property
right in the unpublished work—essentially, a common law copyright in unpublished works. The author had the right to keep his works from being published
to protect his “private use and pleasure.”40
Building upon the dictum from Bruce’s opinion below in Prince Albert,
Warren and Brandeis argued that traditional intellectual property concepts came
33. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1st ed. 1868); COOLEY, LAW OF
TORTS FIRST EDITION, supra note 31.
34. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS FIRST EDITION, supra note 31, at 29.
35. Id. This body of law is discussed in greater detail in Part II. See infra notes 152–156 and
accompanying text.
36. (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch.).
37. Prince Albert v. Strange, (1849) 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 295 (Ch.).
38. Id. at 312 (Bruce, V.C.).
39. Id.
40. Prince Albert, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1178.
UPON THE
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close to protecting privacy, but were still too focused on remedying injuries to
property such as lost profits. Concerned with finding a remedy for “mere injury
to the feelings”41 caused by the publication of private facts about individuals,
Warren and Brandeis posited that “the legal doctrines relating to infractions of
what is commonly termed the common-law right to intellectual and artistic
property are, it is believed, but instances and applications of a general right to
privacy, which properly understood affords a remedy for the evils under consideration.”42 Prince Albert suggested that intellectual property law could afford a
remedy of restricting publication in unpublished works. Warren and Brandeis
took this facet of the opinion and used it to turn Prince Albert from an opinion
protecting intellectual property rights to a case protecting individual feelings
and emotions from the pain of unwanted publicity. The authors concluded that
the “principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate
personality.”43 They thus reasoned that the rights protected in Prince Albert
were “part of the more general right to the immunity of the person—the right to
one’s personality.”44 Of course, this reading (much like Bruce’s dictum itself)
had little support in the Anglo-American common law of literary property at the
time.45
In taking this creative reading of the case, Warren and Brandeis minimized
the second basis for the judgment in Prince Albert v. Strange—breach of
confidence. The Lord Chancellor’s opinion on appeal and the Vice Chancellor’s
opinion below noted that confidentiality law provided an independent basis for
granting the injunction against publication of the exhibit catalog. Because
Victoria and Albert had circulated copies of the etchings only to a few friends,
and had only sent copies outside such a circle to the printer for purpose of
making these copies, the Lord Chancellor concluded that Strange’s possession
“must have originated in a breach of trust, confidence, or contract,” most likely
by a clerk to the royal printer.46 Disclosure represented a breach of confidence
because a clerk to trusted professionals like printers and merchants owed the
same implied contractual duty as his master “that he will not make public that
which he learns in the execution of his duty as clerk.”47 Thus, the printer’s
assistant had a duty to the Queen and the Prince to maintain the confidentiality
of their etchings. The breach of this duty could be enforced against subsequent
41. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 197.
42. Id. at 198.
43. Id. at 205.
44. Id. at 207.
45. See, e.g., PRATT, supra note 8, at 26–32; Post, supra note 8, at 658. Robert Post notes further that
“even Brandeis himself appears later to have abandoned any pretension that common law copyright
could be given the interpretation he and Warren advocated in their article.” Id. (quoting Brandeis’s
dissent in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 253–55 (1918)).
46. Prince Albert v. Strange, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1179 (Ch.).
47. Id. at 1179.
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holders of the etchings and the plates used to make copies of them. Strange’s
catalog was made with the plates he obtained from a breach of confidence.
Because the catalog could not have been produced without the plates, Strange
was enjoined from distributing it under a breach of confidence theory.
Warren and Brandeis were well aware of the body of confidentiality law on
the books in 1890. Although they noted that breach of confidence had been used
in a number of English cases to protect private information from disclosure,
they rejected this doctrine because it did not serve their purposes.48 Then as
now, confidentiality is about protecting information from disclosure in the
context of relationships. But the injury which Warren and Brandeis were most
concerned about—the publication of embarrassing facts about people by the
press—did not involve the kind of relationships the law had to that point
protected. Rather than protecting the reliance interest in nondisclosure of information in relationships, Warren and Brandeis sought a right against the world to
protect hurt feelings.
For example, although one English case had found a breach of confidence
where a photographer had used one of his female client’s photographs as a
Christmas card without her consent,49 this holding did not extend to nonconsensual snap photography outside the context of a photographer-client relationship
or, as Warren and Brandeis put it, the “granting [of] a remedy against a
stranger.”50 Warren and Brandeis were not satisfied with confidentiality because
they had in mind the candid photographer, a stranger who did not have a
relationship with the subject of the photo. They observed that with earlier
photographic technology, “one’s picture could seldom be taken without his
consciously ‘sitting’ for the purpose.”51 Accordingly, photography required a
relationship between photographer and subject. Warren and Brandeis argued
that “since the latest advances in photographic art have rendered it possible to
take pictures surreptitiously, the doctrines of contract and of trust are inadequate
to support the required protection.”52 Moreover, they presented the hypothetical
situation of a person receiving a wrongly addressed letter and opening and
reading it anyway. The authors observed: “Surely, [the recipient] has not made
any contract; he has not accepted any trust.”53 Therefore, they concluded, the
right to privacy does not arise “from contract or from special trust,” but must be
understood as a right “as against the world.”54 “The principle which protects
personal writings and any other production of the intellect or of the emotions,”
they observed, “is the right to privacy, and the law has no new principle to
formulate when it extends this protection to the personal appearance, sayings,
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 211–12.
Pollard v. Photographic Co., (1888) 40 Ch.D. 345, 349 (U.K.).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213.
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acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.”55 This right, they asserted, applied not just to photographic portraiture but also to “pen portraiture,
. . . a discussion by the press of one’s private affairs.” This passage was perhaps
the most breathtaking moment of the article, when Warren and Brandeis dramatically expanded the foundation of the right of nondisclosure from one based on
relationships to a general right against all not to have one’s private affairs
discussed in public in any form.
Warren and Brandeis did not expressly reject breach of confidentiality as a
remedy for invasions of privacy, but instead of developing this concept and line
of cases, they shifted to a different path. They explained the goal of privacy
protections not as enforcing the norms and morality of relationships but as
protecting an “inviolate personality” and the feelings of the individual from
injury.56 Perhaps because they were focused primarily on the “ruthless publicity” of “a discussion by the press of one’s private affairs,”57 Warren and
Brandeis neglected to see that a lot of privacy invasions still involved relationships between people. They were certainly correct that confidentiality alone
would not protect information from disclosure in many cases where it was
warranted, but as we will demonstrate later on, they failed to appreciate the full
power and potential of confidentiality.
B. CONFIDENTIALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY BEFORE ITS “BIRTH”

Scholars have largely ignored the existence of privacy law before Warren and
Brandeis. In large part this is because of the conventional wisdom that Warren
and Brandeis created the right to privacy. Nevertheless, as the preceding
discussion suggests, a significant body of Anglo-American law protecting personal information from disclosure through confidentiality existed long before
Warren and Brandeis published their article.
The concept of confidentiality as a value essential to a variety of personal relationships can be traced back to antiquity. For example, in the physician-patient context,
the Hippocratic Oath, circa 400 B.C. states: “Whatever, in connection with my
professional service, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men,
which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such
should be kept secret.”58 Confidentiality (or “confidence” to use its earlier terminology) is a concept with ancient origins in the Anglo-American common law as well.
F.W. Maitland, a leading early English legal historian, quoted an old sixteenth-century
rhyme in his lectures on equity:
These three give place in court of conscience

55. Id.
56. Id. at 211.
57. Id. at 213–14.
58. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 350 (2d ed.
2006) (quoting Hippocratic Oath).
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Fraud, accident, and breach of confidence.59

By the time Warren and Brandeis wrote, the law had recognized and protected
confidentiality in a number of contexts. Although confidentiality was not considered to be a discrete area of law, Anglo-American statutory and common law
protected confidentiality in many kinds of relationships and in various types of
communications.
1. The Law of Confidential Relationships
a. Evidentiary Privileges. Among the oldest legal protections of confidentiality are evidentiary privileges, which enable one party to a relationship to
prohibit the other party from revealing confidences in court. The attorney-client
privilege, which dates back at least to 1577,60 prevents attorneys from divulging
in court information their clients provide to them during the course of legal
representation. The privilege was justified not as protecting the client’s individual rights and inviolate personality, but as ensuring the integrity of attorneyclient relationships by promoting complete and candid communication.61 English
law also developed privileges pertaining to spousal relations, under which
spouses were prohibited from testifying against each other. Courts in the
nineteenth century frequently alluded to the need to protect the confidential
communications of the marital relationship.62
The protections for confidential information provided by evidentiary privileges were recognized in early American cases as well. In the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, state courts in the United States recognized England’s
attorney-client privilege and spousal privileges.63 Thus in 1811, a Pennsylvania
court declared:
The general rule is that every person not infamous or interested, is a competent witness. To this there have been exceptions, perhaps as ancient as the

59. F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 7 (A.H. Chaylor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Fred.
B. Rothman & Co. 1984) (1926); see also BRIAN C. REID, CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE LAW 1 (1986). The
term “confidence” in the early cases meant something broader than the modern meaning of “confidentiality.” “Confidence” meant trust and reliance, and it could be breached in a number of ways beyond the
disclosure of confidential information, such as fraud and self-dealing. Nevertheless, the disclosure of
confidential information constituted a large part of breaches of confidence.
60. Berd v. Lovelace, (1577) 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (ch.).
61. PRATT, supra note 8, at 42.
62. See, e.g., Monroe v. Twistleton, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (“[I]t shall never be endured that
the confidence which the law has created while the parties remained in the most intimate of all
relations, shall be broken whenever by the misconduct of one party . . . the relation shall have been
dissolved.”); see also PRATT, supra note 8, at 43–44.
63. Developments in the Law—Privileged Communication, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1458–60 (1985);
see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 1061, 1087 (1978) (“There appear to be no American cases on the attorney-client privilege until
the 1820s.”).
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rule. Husband and wife shall not testify for or against each other. An attorney
at law shall not betray the confidence of his client.64

Most states did not recognize physician and clergymen privileges at early
common law, although most states codified such privileges by statute during the
middle portion of the nineteenth century.65 Nevertheless, as an 1889 article in
the American Law Register revealed, the protection through privilege law of
“confidential communications” made to lawyers, doctors, and clergy was widespread in American law by the time Warren and Brandeis were writing their
article. 66
b. Confidential Relations. Related to privileges were duties of nondisclosure
imposed on a category of relationships known as “confidential relations.” These
relationships were a forerunner of the modern body of law of fiduciaries. The
law of confidential relations protected a variety of special relationships in which
one party entrusted her interests to another. Because the party placing her trust
and confidence in the other was extremely vulnerable to harm if the other party
abused this trust, the law stepped in to protect this reliance.
Duties of nondisclosure attaching to special relationships were distinct from
evidentiary privileges. Privileges merely prohibited a person from testifying
about certain information in court, and the common law construed them narrowly because they ran directly counter to the truth-seeking function of the
judicial process. By contrast, duties of nondisclosure attached to confidential
relationships prohibited a person from divulging confidential information to any
unauthorized person on pain of liability.67
In The Law of Torts, Cooley devoted an entire chapter to wrongs committed
in confidential relations. Cooley defined confidential relations as “relations
formed by convention or by acquiescence, in which one party trusts his pecuniary or other interests to the fidelity and integrity of another, by whom, either
alone, or in conjunction with himself, he expects them to be guarded and
protected.”68 Under such circumstances, equity intervened to protect the vulnerable party from abuse as a result of the power or influence imbalance in the
relationship. Cooley observed that confidential relations exist between agent
and principal, trustor and trustee, parent and child, and husband and wife,

64. Steele v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 3 Binn. 306, 313 (Pa. 1811).
65. Developments in the Law, supra note 63, at 1457–58.
66. G.W. Field & John B. Uhle, Privileged Communications, 37 AM. L. REG. 1, 1 (1889). The use of
the phrase “confidential communications” was widespread during this period. See, e.g., 1 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW xlvii (1904) (listing the
topic of “confidential communications” as an area of evidence law in his table of contents); see also 4
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2285–87
(1904).
67. PRATT, supra note 8, at 44–48.
68. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS FIRST EDITION, supra note 31, at 508.
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among others.69 Many of these relationships included duties of confidentiality.
One of the most important duties of confidentiality was that between a lawyer
and his client. Cooley argued that such a duty was crucial to optimally serving
the client’s needs:
So close is the confidence which this relation demands that the client is
expected and invited by the law to lay open to his adviser all that he may
know, believe or suspect—all, in fact, that may be in his mind—which it can
possibly be important for the adviser to know in order to prepare him to
render valuable services; and the confidence thus invited the law protects, and
it will not permit the adviser to disclose what has been communicated to him,
not even as a witness in judicial proceedings, without his employer’s consent.
Still less will the law justify him in a voluntary disclosure.70

The law of confidential relations applied to specific relationships such as
those enumerated by Cooley in his treatise. Nevertheless, this list was insufficient to protect instances of disclosure of confidential information in other
relationships. In this context, English courts of equity filled the gap by fashioning an action for breach of confidence that could apply even where there was no
attorney-client relationship or other “direct confidential relation,”71 such as the
disclosure of personal or trade secrets. Legal remedies for divulging such
confidential information began to emerge as early as the eighteenth century. In
1758, in Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare,72 the court held that equity could
restrain the publication of a manuscript shared with another for any purposes
except publication. Although the court did not talk in terms of breach of
confidence, later authorities regard the case as an early example of the tort.73 In
1820, Lord Eldon issued an injunction in Yovatt v. Winyard74 protecting a
“breach of trust and confidence,” where an employee stole secret veterinary
medicine recipes and used them in his own business.75
A few years later, in Abernethy v. Hutchinson,76 the Court of Chancery
enjoined the publisher of the British medical journal Lancet from publishing the
transcripts of a series of lectures on surgery obtained from a medical student
attending the lectures.77 The Lord Chancellor held that the student who sold his
notes engaged in either a “breach of trust” or a violation of an implied contract

69. Id. at 508–30. Other classes that he discusses in the chapter include scriveners or draftsmen,
individuals with mental incapacity, and individuals involved in illegal sexual relations. Id.
70. Id. at 527–28 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
71. See Ashburton v. Pape, (1913) 2 Ch.D. 469, 471 (U.K.) (Cozens-Hardy, M.R.).
72. (1758) 28 Eng. Rep. 924, 924 (Ch.).
73. FRANCIS GURRY, BREACH OF CONFIDENCE 278 (1984).
74. (1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (Ch.).
75. Id. at 426.
76. (1825) 26 Eng. Rep. 1313 (Ch.).
77. Id. at 1317.
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arising out of his relationship to the lecturer.78 In his Commentaries on Equity
Jurisprudence, Joseph Story noted without expressly citing Abernethy that
where a person delivers scientific or literary oral lectures, it is not competent
for any person, who is privileged to hear them, to publish the substance of
them from his own notes; for the admission to hear such lectures is upon the
implied confidence and contract, that the hearer will not use any means to
injure, or to take away the exclusive right of the lecturer in his own lectures.79

In the seminal 1851 case of Morison v. Moat,80 the Court of Chancery held
that it was a “breach of faith and of contract” for the son of one deceased
business partner to use the other original partner’s medical formula for his own
business.81 In so doing, the court made clear that breach of confidence was an
equitable remedy separate from property rights; where the father had breached
his duty of confidence not to tell the secret formula to the son, equitable
principles barred the son from using the formula even where the legal remedies
of property and contract were unavailing.82
Two years before the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, in
Pollard v. Photographic Co.,83 the Vice Chancellor enjoined a photographer
from selling Christmas cards featuring a picture of a client based upon the
“common law right of action against Defendant for his breach of contract and
breach of faith.”84 An injunction was warranted, the court concluded, because
the photographer had abused the “power confidentially placed in his hands
merely for the purpose of supplying the customer.”85 The court relied upon two
alternate theories—either that there was a confidentiality term implied in the
contract between the photographer and his client, or that there was a general
duty of confidence that bound the photographer by virtue of his relationship to
his client.86 The court declared:
Where a person obtains information in the course of a confidential employment, the law does not permit him to make any improper use of the information so obtained; and an injunction is granted, if necessary to restrain such
use; as, for instance, to restrain a clerk from disclosing his master’s accounts,

78. Id. at 1316. The court did not talk in terms of breach of confidence (preferring the related term
“breach of trust”) but the case (which was cited by Warren and Brandeis) has been interpreted by
subsequent courts as a foundational breach of confidence case. See R.G. TOULSON & C.M. PHIPPS,
CONFIDENTIALITY 6–7 (1996).
79. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 264 (3d rev., corrected, and enlarged ed. 1843).
80. (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch.).
81. Id. at 501.
82. Id. at 498.
83. (1888) 40 Ch.D. 345, 353.
84. Id. at 353.
85. Id. at 349.
86. Id. at 349–50.
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or an attorney from making known his client’s affairs, learned in the course of
such employment.87

Other nineteenth-century cases reached similar results.88
The cases discussed above might be read as intellectual property cases, yet
they were often based on two rationales—property and breach of confidence.
Indeed, Prince Albert v. Strange followed the same pattern, as it was based both
on property rights as well as the duties of confidentiality that the printer and his
assistants owed to their royal clients.89 These cases protect an equitable interest
separate and apart from property, except perhaps property in the most vague and
metaphorical sense. Indeed, the pre-Warren and Brandeis Pollard case explicitly
rejected a hard property-only position, holding that “[t]he right to grant an
injunction does not depend in any way on the existence of property.”90 Moreover, as the leading English treatise on breach of confidence law notes, “[u]ndoubtedly most of the references in the cases to confidential information as
property are metaphorical. The courts have frequently described a confider’s
rights as proprietary in contexts which make it clear that the description is
merely a convenient term to apply to the confider’s rights in contract and
equity.”91 Furthermore, these English breach of confidence cases were also
relied upon by American courts interpreting this area of the common law as
protecting a broader interest than property.92 By the time of 1890, then, the
English law of confidence was established as a coherent equitable cause of
action that was quite distinct from the gloss that Warren and Brandeis placed
upon it.
c. Blackmail Law. A related protection of confidential relationships emerged
in blackmail law. Before 1890, blackmail law protected confidentiality by
preventing servants, lovers, and others from revealing secrets about relationships with wealthy elites. In his study of blackmail, Angus McLaren notes that
the term “blackmail” originated from Tudor times and was a general term for
extortion.93 Blackmail’s more contemporary meaning—as prohibiting people
from issuing threats to divulge secrets in return for hush money—developed in
87. Id. at 349.
88. See, e.g., Clague v. City Bank, 8 La. 48, 50 (1835); Lamb v. Evans, (1893) 1 Ch. 218, 226;
Foster v. Bank of London, (1862) 176 Eng. Rep. 96, 98; Tipping v. Clarke, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 157,
161 (Ch.); Beeston v. Collyer, (1827) 172 Eng. Rep. 276, 277. For a more detailed discussion of the
English cases on this point, see generally David J. Seipp, English Judicial Recognition of a Right to
Privacy, 3 O.J.L.S. 325, 342–45 (1983).
89. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
90. Pollard, 40 Ch.D. at 354.
91. GURRY, supra note 73, at 47.
92. See, e.g., Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 102 N.E. 441, 442–43 (Mass. 1913); Peabody v. Norfolk,
98 Mass. 452 (1868); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J.,
dissenting); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 71 A. 802 (R.I.
1909); Klug v. Sheriffs, 109 N.W. 656 (Wis. 1906).
93. ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL BLACKMAIL: A MODERN HISTORY 12 (2002).
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eighteenth-century England. McLaren observes: “Modern blackmail first emerged
when criminals in the eighteenth century recognized that laws against sodomy
provided them with the means by which they could extort money from those
whom they could entrap.”94
Blackmail statutes emerged in the United States throughout the first half of
the nineteenth century.95 Lawrence Friedman notes that “about half of the states
criminalized blackmail in situations where what the blackmailer threatened to
expose was not only actual crimes, but also infirmities, immoral conduct, or
other things that would expose the victim to ridicule or disgrace in society.”96
The law of blackmail developed substantially during the nineteenth century
because people would transgress strict Victorian laws against vice in the shadows while carefully maintaining a veneer of respectability in public.97 Blackmailers were generally in a very different social class from their victims. The
blackmailers were often poor—they were prostitutes, servants, or others who
engaged in illicit trysts with wealthy elites. Even when not involved in a sexual
relationship, servants often had intimate knowledge of their employer’s private
affairs. This placed wealthy elites in a precarious and vulnerable position:
The courts had for centuries reassured [the wealthy] that their good names
were protected by the laws on libel and slander. The publicity given to the
emergence of the blackmailer raised the horrific possibility that the pillaging
of the propertied could be carried out by those who threatened not to tell
hurtful lies, but obscene truths.98

McLaren observes that “[b]lackmail scandals exacerbated old fears the well-off
had always had of being robbed by their staff.”99 Blackmail thus frequently
served to ensure that the servants and illicit lovers of the affluent would
maintain confidentiality and not exploit the secrets that they learned.
d. Government Records. In addition to the myriad legal protections of information shared between individuals in confidential relationships, United States law
also protected the confidentiality of information people supplied to the government. During the nineteenth century, one of the most conspicuous instances of
government information gathering occurred with the census. Throughout the
century, successive censuses asked increasingly more numerous and more
intrusive questions; some of which began to involve personal matters.100 Com94. Id. at 3.
95. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal
History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1111–12 (2002).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1102.
98. MCLAREN, supra note 93, at 28–29.
99. Id. at 80.
100. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
46 (1995).
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pounding the invasiveness of the questioning, census forms were made available to the public.101 The census began to raise a considerable public outcry.
One magazine quipped: “Be kind to the census man. . . . If you must kick him,
kick him softly . . . .”102 To ameliorate people’s privacy concerns, the government began promising confidentiality. As early as 1840, census officials noted
that some people might not candidly answer census questions “upon the ground
of disinclination to expose their private affairs.”103 Accordingly, sensitive data
from the census would not be released in identifiable form and it was “inculcated upon the assistant that he consider all communications made to him in the
performance of his duty, relative to the business of the people, as strictly
confidential.”104 In 1889, Congress enacted a law fining census officials $500
for disclosing confidential information.105
Confidentiality was also mandated for tax officials when they began collecting federal income taxes during the Civil War.106 Tax fraud ultimately led the
government to make returns available for press scrutiny, but this move “engendered sufficient hostility to kill the [wartime] tax and, later, to prevent any
attempt to reinstitute it.”107 Seipp observes: “[A]s more and more personal and
financial information was required by expanding government enterprises, courts
and legislatures demanded greater confidentiality from recordkeepers and attempted to limit the access of others to such information.”108
2. The Law of Confidential Communications
Beyond protecting the exchange of information in professional and contractual relationships, the law also protected certain types of confidential communications between people in nearly all kinds of relationships. Protection was
premised on one or both of two rationales. First, communicants were viewed as
having a confidential relationship that prohibited either party from divulging
their communications. Second, where communicants used a service like the post
office or a telegraph company to deliver their communications, duties of
confidentiality were placed upon those entities as well.
a. Letters and Literary Expression. By 1890, the law of postal confidentiality
and literary property protected the confidentiality of letters. Since colonial
times, the privacy of letters has depended on confidentiality. Early letters were

101. See DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 19 (1978), available at
http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/seipp%5Cseipp-p78-3.pdf.
102. Id. at 46.
103. Id. at 21 (quoting Instructions to Marshals, Etc.—Census of 1840).
104. Id. (quoting Instructions to Marshals, Etc.—Census of 1840).
105. Id. at 51–52; see also Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 319, §§ 8, 13, 25 Stat. 760, 763, 764.
106. SEIPP, supra note 101, at 50.
107. Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1906
(1981).
108. Id. at 1907.
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very difficult to seal, and they would frequently be read by others.109 Moreover,
letter delivery often included delivery to taverns or coffee houses where the
letters would be left in public for pickup.110 The American postal service, begun
in colonial times, depended on its employees being trustworthy and not prying
into letters. The 1710 Post Office Act of Parliament, applicable to both domestic
and colonial post offices, mandated that “[n]o person or persons shall presume
wittingly, willingly, or knowingly, to open detain, or delay, or cause, procure,
permit, or suffer to be opened, detained or delayed, any letter or letters, packet
or packets.”111 Benjamin Franklin and William Hunter, who served as the
deputy postmasters general for the colonies in the 1750s, made employees
swear a similar oath not to open the mail.112 In 1782, the Continental Congress
passed a law to protect the confidentiality of letters.113 Congress enacted
another law in 1825 to protect the confidentiality of letters by criminalizing
taking “any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any
authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier.”114 And
in 1877, in Ex parte Jackson,115 the Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth
Amendment protected letters from government inspection without a warrant.116
The fact that people willingly gave the government their letters for delivery did
not waive protection, as the government was expected to keep them confidential. As Anuj Desai has argued, this holding represented the embodiment of
earlier notions of postal confidentiality into the very fabric of the Constitution.117
The legal protections regarding the confidentiality of letters in the postal
system reflected cultural changes that came to regard the mails as “sacred.”118
While even George Washington had feared that the sentiments he expressed in
letters about the new Constitution were not confidential, “for by passing through
the post-office, they should become known to all the world,”119 by the end of
the nineteenth century a remarkable transformation in social attitudes and law
had taken place. As David Seipp explains, “[n]ineteenth century public opinion
regarded the ‘sanctity of the mails’ as absolute in the same way it esteemed the

109. See DAVID FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 118 (1972); ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN
FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 24–26 (2000).
110. FLAHERTY, supra note 109, at 116; SEIPP, supra note 101, at 7–8.
111. SEIPP, supra note 101, at 9 (quoting 9 Anne cap. X, § 40).
112. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 100, at 45; SEIPP, supra note 101, at 9; Anuj Desai, The Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
113. SMITH, supra note 109, at 50.
114. Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 22, 4 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2000))
(language quoted is from 18 U.S.C. § 1702). This law is still valid today. See SMITH, supra note 109, at
51.
115. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
116. Id. at 733.
117. Desai, supra note 112 (manuscript at 3–4, on file with authors).
118. See Note, supra note 107, at 1899.
119. SEIPP, supra note 101, at 11 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette
(Feb. 7, 1788), in 11 WRITINGS 218 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1891)).
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inviolability of the home.”120 Improved confidentiality procedures in the Post
Office and strong legal protections went hand in hand with an emerging attitude
that the ideas and sentiments expressed in letters traveling through the postal
system should remain inviolate, in language often tinged with overtly religious
imagery. Thus, a Louisiana court could refer in 1811 to the law’s respect for
“the sacredness of a man’s correspondence.”121
The “sacredness” of personal correspondence promoted by the postal system’s public law regime was buttressed by related private law doctrines protecting the unpublished expressions in letters from unwanted disclosure. A variety
of state laws protected against “the violation of epistolary correspondence.”122
Such statutes reflected norms deeply woven into the common law. In Pope v.
Curl,123 a famous English case involving an attempt to publish letters from
Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope, Lord Hardwicke noted that for the recipient of the letter, “possibly the property of the paper may belong to him, but this
does not give license to any person whatsoever to publish them to the world, for
at most, the receiver has only a joint property with the writer.”124 This doctrine
was reaffirmed in Gee v. Pritchard,125 in which Lord Eldon explained that the
author of letters retained the right to forbid their publication by the recipient,
although principally on a theory of property rights rather than privacy or
confidence.126 However, as Seipp notes in connection with these cases, “the
grounds of property protection soon became a convenient fiction” serving a
broader policy of protection for confidential communications.127
Joseph Story’s nineteenth-century American interpretation of these English
cases similarly asserted the sacredness of personal correspondence and the
breadth with which property theory could be used to protect them in equity.
Writing in his influential Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence in 1843, Story
agreed that the doctrine of Pope and Gee did not rest on “any notion, that the
publication of letters would be painful to the feelings of the writer,” but rather
on basic notions of property law by which the property in the expression
remained with the sender subject only to the recipient’s right to read.128 But
Story noted that these protections extended beyond valuable compositions such
as those by Swift and Pope to also cover “mere private letters on business, or on
family concerns, or on matters of personal friendship, and not strictly falling
within the line of literary compositions.”129 He added that “the publication of
120. Note, supra note 107, at 1890.
121. Denis v. LeClerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 313 (Orleans 1811); see also Note, supra note 107, at
1899 n.51 (collecting examples).
122. Note, supra note 107, at 1900.
123. (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.)
124. Id. at 608.
125. (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch.).
126. Id. at 674–75, 678.
127. Seipp, supra note 88, at 337–38.
128. STORY, supra note 79, at 260.
129. Id. at 261.
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such letters . . . is, perhaps one of the most odious breaches of private confidence, of social duty, and of honorable feelings, which can well be imagined.”130 Story explained that letters contain intimate details that are “reposed in
the bosoms of others under the deepest and most affecting confidence” and that
“should for ever remain inviolable secrets.”131 Failing to protect confidentiality
in letters would “compel every one, in self-defence, to write, even to his dearest
friends, with the cold and formal severity with which he would write to his
wariest opponents, or his most implacable enemies.”132 Accordingly, Story
noted, except in cases where the production of letters was necessary in litigation
of matters of “public justice,” equity could intervene to protect the letters
“where publication would be a violation of a trust or confidence, founded in
contract, or implied from circumstances.”133 The property right of the sender of
a letter thus dovetailed with established breach of confidence law to provide an
actionable remedy in equity against unwanted disclosures.134
Numerous American cases protected the confidentiality of private letters prior
to 1890. For example, in Dennis v. LeClerc,135 a newspaper editor sought to
publish an improperly obtained letter from a sender to a female acquaintance.
The court enjoined the publication of the letter, holding that the sender of a
letter retained a qualified property right in the letter that allowed him to prevent
its publication, copying, or even its use contrary to the presumed intention of
the sender.136 The court also discussed the wrongfulness of the “disclosure of
the contents of a confidential communication,”137 concluding that because the
letter was written in “mystery and confidence” (a term of art in Louisiana law),
“the defendant could not produce it to light without crime.”138 Moreover, just as
the defendant could not produce it to his associates, he could also not publish it
in the press, due to the “sacredness” of the “confidential letter.”139
The Georgia Supreme Court ruled in 1859 that publication of “confidential
correspondence” from one member of a partnership to another after dissolution
of the partnership was enjoinable by a court sitting in equity.140 That court
understood the magnitude of the issue to be as follows:

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 262, 264.
134. Cf. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §253 (Simon Greenleaf Croswell
ed., 15th rev. ed. 1892) (evidence law also prohibited the revelation of private letters in court, especially
those that might be “injurious to the feelings or interest of third persons”).
135. 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297 (Orleans 1811).
136. Id. at 299.
137. Id. at 309–10.
138. Id. at 312.
139. Id. at 313–15.
140. Roberts v. McKee, 29 Ga. 161 (1859).
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To give publicity, wantonly, to confidential correspondence, meets with the
prompt rebuke and merited condemnation of every one not lost to all honorable feeling. It is a death-blow to the best interests of civilized society itself,
as well as to all the endearments of family and social intercourse. While all
this is fully admitted, the issue to be met and decided is, are Courts of Equity
clothed with power to interpose and grant relief in such cases?141

Answering this question in the affirmative, and relying heavily upon Story’s
equity treatise, the court concluded that the sender had a qualified property right
in restraining publication of the letter “to promote confidence—the only solid
foundation upon which society rests—by taking away the temptation to its
betrayal.”142 Many other state and federal cases protected the confidentiality of
letters in the possession of recipients from publication or sale under property or
overt confidence theories, but nevertheless stand for the broader proposition that
the relationship between the sender and recipient of letters would be protected.143
b. The Telegraph. The invention of the telegraph in 1844 raised new issues
for the law of confidentiality. As Thomas Cooley put it, “[t]here are [] to every
telegraphic despatch [sic] three parties—the sender, the receiver, and the telegraph company.”144 Employees of telegraph companies like Western Union had
access to telegraph messages, raising concerns about confidentiality akin to
those raised with the postal system over a century before. Throughout the
second half of the nineteenth century, numerous laws arose to address the
confidentiality of telegraphic communications.
In order to promote telegraphy as an effective and secure means of communications, telegraph companies were eager to assure their customers that their
messages would be held in confidence. Telegraph companies prohibited employees from disclosing telegrams and often resisted attempts to subpoena telegrams.145 One study even suggests that Western Union employees in the 1870s
would burn a message rather than disclose it under compulsion,146 and there is
some evidence that individual employees resisted attempts to breach telegraphic

141. Id. at 163.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Rice v. Williams, 32 F. 437, 439 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1887) (sale of letters relating to
medical afflictions was “grossly disreputable business”); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345–47
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (court of equity can restrain wrongful publication of private letters “as
a breach of private confidence or contract”); Dock v. Dock, 36 A. 411, 412 (Pa. 1897) (writer of letters
has a “special property” right allowing her to withhold their publication or use by one wrongfully in
possession); Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Pr. 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861) (personal and business letters in
hands of executor are not assets subject to sale); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855)
(protecting letters under a literary property theory with reference to confidentiality).
144. Thomas M. Cooley, Inviolability of Telegraphic Correspondence, 27 AM. L. REG. 65, 66 (1879).
145. Note, supra note 107, at 1901 & n.68 (citing WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO., RULES, REGULATIONS, AND INSTRUCTIONS NO. 128, at 55 (Cleveland, 1866)).
146. SMITH, supra note 109, at 67–68.
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confidentiality in the face of legal process.147
Telegraphic confidentiality may have been good business, but it was a
practice that became increasingly mandated by law. According to one treatise on
the law of telegraphs, two-thirds of states had by 1879 passed some sort of
statute imposing a nondisclosure obligation on telegraph company employees in
order to protect the “inviolability” of telegrams.148 Many states also protected
telegrams against wiretapping by the government.149 Advocates of telegraphic
inviolability went even further and argued that the contents of telegrams should
be privileged and inadmissible in court,150 although such arguments were
largely unsuccessful.151 However, as a result of the arguments of advocates of
telegraph confidentiality, courts rejected “dragnet” searches of telegraph records
by requiring subpoenas for telegrams to specify the date and topic of any
telegrams that were sought.152 Thus, by 1890 both public opinion and significant statutory law gave substantial protection to telegraphic confidentiality.
***
As the preceding discussion illustrates, Warren and Brandeis did not write on
a nearly blank slate when they crafted their “right to privacy.” Instead of
developing and expanding the robust law of confidentiality that already existed,
Warren and Brandeis took American privacy law down a different path. Before
the Warren and Brandeis article, English and American privacy law were on a
similar trajectory, being built out of the same materials and concepts. American
judges read English precedent and attempted to situate their rulings within the
fabric of the common law. Afterwards, the paths diverged. The next Part
explores the path Warren and Brandeis charted for American privacy law, and
also the path not taken—that of developing the law of confidentiality. England
took this alternative path, with some illuminating and fascinating results.
II. PRIVACY’S DIVERGENT PATHS
Throughout the twentieth century, American privacy law began to embrace Warren
and Brandeis’s right to privacy. In contrast, in England, the Warren and Brandeis
article had a chilly reception and was rejected. Instead of creating a law of privacy,
England developed a law of confidentiality, which was explicitly distinguished from
privacy. Ironically, both the American law of privacy and the English law of confidentiality emerged from the same source—the Prince Albert case. In this Part, we
compare the two divergent paths leading from Prince Albert.

147. See Ex parte Brown, 7 Mo. App. 484, 494 (App. Ct. 1879) (affirming contempt conviction
against telegraph office manager who refused to comply with a third-party subpoena).
148. MORRIS GRAY, A TREATISE ON COMMUNICATION BY TELEGRAPH 212 & n.1, 213 & nn.1–3 (1879)
(collecting statutes).
149. See Note, supra note 107, at 1901.
150. See Ex Parte Brown, 7 Mo. App. at 494–96 (Lewis, P.J., dissenting); Cooley, supra note 144, at
77.
151. GRAY, supra note 148, at 213–14.
152. Note, supra note 107, at 1902.
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A. PRIVACY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA

1. Early Developments
In the twentieth century, privacy torts inspired by Warren and Brandeis’s
article slowly developed and proliferated in the United States. As early as 1891,
a New York judge recognized the Warren and Brandeis right to privacy in
Schuyler v. Curtis,153 a case involving the erection of a statue of a deceased
philanthropist.154 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the decision, not
because it rejected the right to privacy, but because it concluded that upon a
person’s death any right to privacy died with him.155 In the lower state and
federal courts, a handful of other early cases flirted with recognizing a right of
privacy156 and generated a flurry of scholarly commentary before the turn of the
century.157
The first state court of last resort to rule on the right to privacy was the New
York Court of Appeals. In the famous 1902 case of Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Co.,158 the court squarely rejected the right to privacy. An advertisement for Franklin Mills Flour used a drawing of a young woman, Abigail
Roberson, without her consent. The picture was a flattering one, but Roberson
sued because she was “humiliated” by it and suffered mental distress as a
result.159 The court concluded that there was no precedent to recognize Warren
and Brandeis’s tort remedies for invasion of privacy, and that such a right was
best left to the legislature to enact.160 The Roberson case produced a wave of
153. 45 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
154. Id. at 788; see also Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (finding violation of Warren
and Brandeis’s right to privacy where newspaper published picture of actor for purposes of testing his
popularity).
155. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25–26 (N.Y. 1895).
156. See Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1893) (refusing to enjoin
biography of inventor on grounds he was public figure); Atkinson v. Doherty, 80 N.W. 285 (Mich.
1899) (rejecting privacy claim by widow of politician who objected to his likeness appearing on a cigar
label on ground that public figures surrender privacy rights to the public); Murray v. Gast Lithographic
& Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 271 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (parents cannot enjoin unauthorized publication of
pictures of their children).
157. See generally Herbert Spencer Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 N.W. L. REV. 1 (1894);
Augustus Hand, Schuyler Against Curtis and the Right to Privacy, 36 AMER. L. REG. (n.s.) 745 (1897);
John Gilmer Speed, The Right to Privacy, 163 N. AM. L. REV. 64 (1896); Recent Cases, Untitled
(Atkinson v. Doherty), 5 VA. L. REG. 710 (1899); Guy Thompson, The Right of Privacy as Recognized
and Protected at Law and in Equity, 47 CENTRAL L.J. 148 (1898); Note, Development of the Law of
Privacy, 8 HARV. L. REV. 280 (1894); Comment, Is This Libel?—More about Privacy, 7 HARV. L. REV.
492 (1894); Case Comment, A New Phase of the Right to Privacy, 10 HARV. L. REV. 179 (1896); The
Right to Privacy, 3 GREEN BAG 524 (1891); Comment, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L. REV. 148
(1891); Case Comment, The Right to Privacy, 7 HARV. L. REV. 182 (1893); Case Comment, The Right
to Privacy, 12 HARV. L. REV. 207 (1898); The Right to Privacy, 4 MADRAS L.J. 17 (1894), reprinted in 6
GREEN BAG 498 (1894); Comment, The Right to Privacy—The Schuyler Injunction, 9 HARV. L. REV. 354
(1895); Recent Cases, Torts—Right to Privacy, 13 HARV. L. REV. 415 (1900); Comment, Untitled
(Marks v. Jaffa), 2 N.W. L. REV. 91 (1894).
158. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
159. Id. at 442.
160. Id. at 447–48.
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public criticism. An editorial in the New York Times lambasted the decision.161
Commentary in law reviews largely sided with Roberson and decried the court’s
failure to redress her injury,162 although one of the judges who decided the
Roberson case took the unusual step of defending the decision in the Columbia
Law Review.163 A year later, in 1903, the New York legislature responded to the
case by enacting a statute allowing people to sue for invasion of privacy where
their “name, portrait, or picture” was used without consent “for purposes of
trade.”164
Two years later, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized in the common law a
tort remedy for invasions of privacy. The case, Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co.,165 involved a situation similar to that in Roberson—a man’s
image was used in an advertisement without his consent. The court concluded
that a “right of privacy in matters purely private is . . . derived from natural
law.”166
From its start in Pavesich, the new privacy tort began to slowly spread from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The early privacy cases were in some disarray, with
courts in various states embracing or rejecting rights to privacy in tort in a
variety of commercial and personal contexts. The fact pattern of Roberson and
Pavesich was common, with perhaps a majority of the early cases recognizing
rights of privacy in the context of the unconsented use of photographs in
advertising.167 Nevertheless, as contemporary commentators recognized,168 courts
recognizing the right to privacy invariably did so under the auspices of the
theory (if not the precise theory) laid out by Warren and Brandeis.169 Over the

161. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, reprinted in Denis O’Brien, The Right to Privacy, 2
COLUM. L. REV. 437, 447 (1902) (declaring that Roberson “excited as much amazement among lawyers
and jurists as among the promiscuous lay public”).
162. See generally Alexander Armstrong, Jr., Note, Injunction—Rights of Privacy—Enforcement in
Equity, 50 AM. L. REG. 669 (1902); Comment, An Actionable Right to Privacy?, 12 YALE L.J. 35, 36–37
(1902); Case Comment, The Miscalled Right of Privacy, 10 AM. LAWYER 293 (1902); Note, Publication
of Photograph as an Advertisement, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 486 (1902); Note, The Right of Privacy, 64 ALB.
L.J. 409 (1902); Note and Comment, The Right of Privacy, 3 MICH. L. REV. 559 (1904); Note, Right of
Privacy, 12 VA. L. REG. 91 (1906); Book Review, Right to Privacy, 16 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1902).
163. O’Brien, supra note 161 at 437. O’Brien was not the only participant in Roberson who later
sought to justify its outcome. For another defense, see articles by Elbridge L. Adams, counsel for the
defendant: Elbridge L. Adams, The Law of Privacy, 175 N. AM. REV. 361 (1902); Elbridge L. Adams,
The Right of Privacy, and Its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. L. REV. 37 (1905).
164. See, e.g., Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (1990). The statute, which remains on the books today, is the New York
Civil Rights Law §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1990).
165. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
166. Id. at 70.
167. For a detailed account of the growth of privacy torts, see generally PEMBER, supra note 18.
168. See, e.g., Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by “Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1959);
Wilbur Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693, 697 (1912); Louis Nizer, The Right of
Privacy: A Half-Century’s Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526 (1941); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 636–37 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION]
(collecting cases from this period adopting the Warren and Brandeis argument).
169. PEMBER, supra note 18, at 31, 57.
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ensuing decades, an increasing number of states permitted redress for invasions
of privacy. The First Restatement of Torts, published in 1939, had a brief
section on privacy, which stated: “A person who unreasonably and seriously
interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his
likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.”170 But the spread of the
tort was slow in its first half-century, and as of 1940, only fifteen states had
recognized it.171 During the 1940s and 1950s, many more jurisdictions began
recognizing the right to privacy, with the result that by the late 1950s, most
states had adopted a tort right of privacy in one form or another.172
2. William Prosser and the Maturation of the Privacy Torts
The growing number of privacy cases attracted the attention of William
Prosser, the leading American torts scholar of the mid-twentieth century. Prosser
began the project of imposing some order on the hundreds of privacy cases that
had been decided since 1890. He discussed privacy in all of the editions of his
torts treatise, which were published in 1941, 1955, 1964, and 1971.173 His most
famous discussion of the topic was a 1960 article entitled Privacy published in
the California Law Review.174 In that article, Prosser noted that over 300
privacy cases had been decided since the Warren and Brandeis article, and that
to date, there had been little “attempt to inquire what interests are we protecting,
and against what conduct.”175 He observed that the
law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different
interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but
otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an
interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the phrase coined by Judge
Cooley, ‘to be let alone.’176

Prosser identified the torts as follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.

170. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
171. PEMBER, supra note 18, at 95.
172. Id. at 146.
173. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (1st ed. 1941) [hereinafter PROSSER, TORTS
FIRST EDITION]; PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 168; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER, TORTS THIRD EDITION]; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER, TORTS FOURTH EDITION].
174. Prosser, supra note 4.
175. Id. at 388.
176. Id. at 389.
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4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.177

In creating this taxonomy of the law of privacy, Prosser had a dramatic effect on
the development of privacy law in America. But Prosser’s influence did not only
enhance the development of privacy law, it also led to some significant limitations.
On the surface, Prosser’s project appeared to be descriptive, an attempt
simply to catalog the existing cases. However, Prosser was deliberately shaping
the law, and he understood that he was engaging in such an endeavor. Like
many of his contemporaries, Prosser was a legal realist who believed that tort
law was best understood to be a “common sense” balancing of social interests
rather than a series of universal principles.178 Nevertheless, unlike more extreme realists who doubted the value of legal doctrine, Prosser concentrated his
talents on refining, clarifying, and ordering legal doctrine, since he believed that
law worked best when rules were clear.179 Prosser thus actively attempted to
mold legal doctrine as he described it, something he did when recognizing the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which, like privacy, rested
upon a mental injury.180 He used the same approach in his treatment of privacy.
In his speeches and the various editions of his treatise, casebook, and articles,
Prosser approached the multitude of privacy decisions with a gradual but
systematizing impulse. The 1941 edition of Prosser’s widely read torts treatise
gave privacy limited attention—just twelve pages in a chapter entitled “Miscellaneous.”181 Prosser noted that the privacy cases decided by the various state
courts fell into three rough categories: appropriation of one’s name or likeness,
intrusion into one’s home or personal affairs, and public disclosure of one’s
private information.182 By 1953, though, Prosser concluded that there was a
fourth privacy tort: the so-called “false light” tort redressing publicity that
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. In a lecture in February of
that year at the University of Michigan, he suggested that although the boundaries of the privacy tort were “anything but well defined,” the tort “appears in
reality to be a complex of four more or less related wrongs.”183 He included
false light in his 1955 treatise, where the topic of privacy finally received its
own separate chapter.184
Thus, by the time of his 1960 article, Privacy, Prosser had long been tracking
the development of privacy law. In the article, Prosser described the four torts in

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
WHITE, supra note 28, at 102.
Id. at 157–58.
Id. at 102–06.
PROSSER, TORTS FIRST EDITION, supra note 173, at 1050–1062.
Id. at 1050.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 116–19 (1953).
PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 168.
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great detail and charted their contours and limitations. Prosser was quite skeptical of the privacy torts; he noted that their development “has gone on without
any plan, without much realization of what is happening or its significance, and
without any consideration of its dangers.”185 For Prosser, these dangers were
quite extensive. The intrusion tort was essentially intentional infliction of
emotional distress with fewer limits and no requirement of outrageousness,186
while appropriation created a new and extensive regime of intellectual property
under which every individual had a common law trademark in his name and
likeness unfettered by any of the policy limitations placed on business marks.187
Even more dangerous, he believed, were the torts of false light and public
disclosure. Both torts, Prosser argued, moved into the field of defamation law,
but did so by removing many of the careful limitations that the law had
developed for libel and slander in order to protect freedom of speech and press.
Gone, according to Prosser, were the defense of truth, the requirement of special
damages for most types of statements affecting reputation, and the need “for
any defamatory innuendo at all.”188 Gone too was the procedural protection
provided by defamation retraction statutes. But the greatest concern, he argued,
was
the extent to which, under any test of ‘ordinary sensibilities,’ or the ‘mores’ of
the community as to what is acceptable and proper, the courts, although
cautiously and reluctantly, have accepted a power of censorship over what the
public may be permitted to read, extending very much beyond that which they
have always had under the law of defamation.189

Prosser went on to observe that he would not view the development of the
privacy torts as “wrong” but “that it is high time that we realize what we are
doing, and give some consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we
are to call a halt.”190 This last statement suggested that perhaps privacy had
already gone too far.
Prosser’s influence over the privacy torts was further enhanced by his position as a reporter of the Second Restatement of Torts, which imported his
four-part taxonomy of the privacy torts—a taxonomy that has been accepted by
virtually all courts and commentators to the present day.191 The tort of intrusion
upon seclusion provides a remedy when a person “intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
185. Prosser, supra note 4, at 422.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 423.
188. Id. at 422.
189. Id. at 423.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG, & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW (2d ed. 2006); RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d
ed. 2002).
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affairs or concerns” in a manner that is “highly offensive to a reasonable
person.”192 Under the public disclosure of private facts tort:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.193

The tort of false light provides a remedy against giving “publicity to a matter
concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light” in a
manner that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”194 Finally, the tort of
appropriation provides: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the
name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.”195
As G. Edward White argues, the “‘tort’ of privacy . . . was in some respects
Prosser’s own invention: he gave privacy a doctrinal unity and continuity that it
had not previously possessed.”196 Recognition by Prosser gave the tort considerable legitimacy. His position as the leading treatise writer, scholar, and casebook
author of his day, along with his position as a reporter of the Restatement, gave
him a unique ability to affect the law at multiple levels. By restating the law of
privacy into a complex of four concrete causes of action, Prosser simplified and
restricted the case law, excluding related theories of relief from his taxonomy
and thus from being associated with the concept of “privacy.” For example,
although Prosser noted the great overlap between intrusion upon seclusion and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, he opted not to include the latter tort
under the rubric of privacy.197
More importantly, Prosser excluded from his complex of privacy torts the
emerging American tort of breach of confidentiality. By 1960, a small group of
American cases had recognized a tort for breach of confidentiality198 or found
breaches of express or implied contracts against nondisclosure.199 For example,

192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
193. Id. § 652D.
194. Id. § 652E.
195. Id. § 652C.
196. WHITE, supra note 28, at 173.
197. PROSSER, TORTS SECOND EDITION, supra note 168, at 639 (noting that “[w]hen the ‘new tort’ of
intentional infliction of mental suffering becomes fully developed and receives general recognition, the
great majority of the privacy cases may very possibly be absorbed into it”).
198. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930) (breach of confidence for
hospital to leak photo of a deformed child—decided on privacy grounds); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W.
849 (Ky. 1912) (photographer breached implied contract when making extra copies of photos of
father’s dead babies); Smith v. Driscoll, 162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917) (assuming doctors can be liable for
breaching the confidences of their patients while testifying in court).
199. See, e.g., McCreery v. Miller’s Groceteria Co., 64 P.2d 803, 805 (Colo. 1937) (purchase of
photograph by person photographed coupled with statement that no further sale of her photographs was
to be permitted created express contract that further copies of photograph must not be sold).
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in the 1920 case of Simonsen v. Swenson,200 the court held that because
physicians were “bound” by “professional honor and the ethics of [their] high
profession” to maintain patient confidentiality, a “wrongful breach of such
confidence, and a betrayal of such trust, would give rise to a civil action for
damages naturally flowing from such wrong.”201 And in Fitzsimmons v. Olinger
Mortuary Ass’n,202 the court found a mortician’s publicity of his use of an
airplane to move a casket violated an implied contract with the decedent’s
widow where she had asked for no “undue publicity or notoriety.”203 As the
court noted, “[i]f this not be true, there is nothing to prevent the embalming of a
body and the parading of it through the city streets, exposed to the gaze of
curious throngs, while a hired caller calls attention to it as an example of the
undertaker’s skill.”204 Prosser, however, gave hardly any attention to the confidence cases in his article, and he did not consider them worthy of establishing a
potential fifth privacy tort.205 Perhaps Prosser did not include breach of confidentiality because the cases did not cite Warren and Brandeis as their origin or
because they were less numerous or more contractual than cases involving the
privacy torts. The result was that the four torts Prosser identified became widely
known as tort law’s way of protecting privacy. Breach of confidentiality was left
out of the picture.
In the third edition of his torts treatise in 1964, Prosser only briefly mentioned a few breach of confidentiality tort cases, including Simonsen, but he did
so only in passing in a discussion of the public disclosure tort.206 Likewise, in
the fourth edition in 1971, the final edition before his death in 1972, Prosser
cited Simonsen along with three other breach of confidentiality cases. He noted
the general rule that the public disclosure tort was limited to instances when the
information was disclosed widely to the public “unless there is some breach of
contract, trust or confidential relation which will afford an independent basis for
relief.”207 He said little else about the breach of confidentiality tort.
Whether intentionally or not, Prosser had the effect of halting the torts’
evolution.208 Despite the fact that the Warren and Brandeis article spawned four

200. 177 N.W. 831 (Neb. 1920).
201. Id. at 832.
202. 17 P.2d 535 (Colo. 1932).
203. Id. at 535.
204. Id. at 537 (implied contract violated where mortuary association publicized delivery of casket
by aircraft against widow’s wishes).
205. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 393–94 (noting that the disclosure tort is not violated by
communication to a small group of people rather than the public at large “unless there is some breach of
contract, trust, or confidential relation which will afford an independent basis for relief”). Prosser also
noted that the disclosure by an individual of information contained only in “confidential” government
records such as tax records was “not open to public inspection” and could thus be the basis for a
disclosure action. See id. at 395–96.
206. PROSSER, TORTS THIRD EDITION, supra note 173, at 807 & n.97.
207. Id. at 810 & n.84.
208. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of
Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1406 (1987) (“Dean Prosser’s categorization of privacy
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torts in the seventy years since its publication, once Prosser identified the torts,
no new privacy torts were created in the common law during the nearly fifty
years thereafter. One exception is the right of publicity, a spinoff from appropriation that protects people’s property rights in their name or likeness. The right of
publicity first emerged in 1953, when Judge Jerome Frank held that “in addition
to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from
statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph.”209 Appropriation remedies the mental distress caused by the improper exploitation of a
person’s name or likeness. In contrast, the right of publicity enables people
(typically celebrities and other famous individuals) to recover the economic
value of their personas when used commercially without their consent. 210 As
one commentator summarizes, appropriation is “invaded by an injury to the
psyche” whereas “the right of publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocket
book.”211 Prosser did not recognize an independent right of publicity, possibly
because he understood appropriation as primarily about property rights rather
than mental distress.212 Aside from the right of publicity, however, Prosser’s
formulations of the privacy torts ossified, and, to this day, they have not
changed in any significant degree. Prosser’s snapshot of the privacy torts in
1960 thus became a permanent image.
The Prosser formulations of the torts became entrenched in the law in part
because he incorporated them into the Second Restatement of Torts when he was
serving as reporter.213 Most states currently follow the Restatement’s formulations of the torts.214 Prosser did not include the breach of confidentiality tort in
the “invasion of privacy” section of the Restatement, which consisted solely of
the four Warren and Brandeis privacy torts. In fact, breach of confidentiality did
not appear in the Restatement at all. Through Prosser, Warren and Brandeis’s
turn from confidentiality became even more frozen into the law.
Following Prosser’s article, the privacy torts continued to flourish, although
along the lines that Prosser had plotted out for them. In 1971, in the fourth
edition of his torts treatise Prosser declared that “[i]n one form or another, the
right of privacy is by this time recognized and accepted in all but a very few
law into four torts, each with several indispensable elements has effectively frozen the development of
privacy law despite the creation of new technologies that detrimentally affect individual privacy.”).
209. Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
210. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L.
REV. 225 (2005).
211. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5:63 (2000); see also id.
§ 5:61.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C, cmt. a (1977) (“Although the protection of [one’s]
personal feelings against mental distress is an important factor leading to a recognition of the
[appropriation tort], the right created by it is in the nature of a property right . . . .”).
213. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied
Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 897 (2006). The privacy torts section of the
Second Restatement was completed in 1967. See id. at 897 n.64. Prosser resigned from serving as
reporter in 1970, and he died in 1972. The Second Restatement was finally published in 1977. Id.
214. Id. at 897.
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jurisdictions.”215 Today, virtually every state recognizes the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts in one form or another.216 However, as Prosser had also
outlined, the privacy torts came under increasing attack from the 1960s onwards
for infringing upon free speech. Three of the four torts were addressed in
Supreme Court cases. In 1967, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,217 the Court held that the
First Amendment required the actual malice standard to establish a false light
claim.218 The right of publicity tort was examined by the Court in 1977 in
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.219 The Court distinguished appropriation from false light, and the branch of the appropriation tort known as the
“right of publicity” narrowly survived a First Amendment challenge.220
The public disclosure tort came to the Court’s attention in 1975 in Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn.221 In Cox Broadcasting, the Court discussed the origins
of the tort in Warren and Brandeis’s article and observed that “the century has
experienced a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy.”222
Basing its decision on the First Amendment, the Court held that despite the right
to privacy’s “impressive credentials,” when “true information is disclosed in
public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”223 The Court declined to address “the broader question” that would implicate the constitutionality of the tort in all its applications—
namely, “whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free
from unwanted publicity in the press.”224
Subsequent Supreme Court cases reiterated the Cox rule. In Smith v. Daily
Mail,225 the Court held: “If a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order.”226 In Florida Star v. B.J.F.,227 the Court reiterated the rule in
Daily Mail by concluding that the First Amendment prohibited liability when a
newspaper published the name of a rape victim obtained from a police report.228
After Florida Star, commentators rushed to give the eulogy for the public
215. PROSSER, TORTS FOURTH EDITION, supra note 173, at 804.
216. See, e.g., ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 77 (2001) (noting that
only North Dakota and Wyoming fail to recognize any of the privacy torts in some form or another).
217. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
218. Id. at 387–88 (“[T]he constitutional protections for speech and press preclude the application of
the New York [privacy] statute to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of
proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth.”).
219. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
220. Id. at 573, 578–79.
221. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
222. Id. at 488.
223. Id. at 489, 496.
224. Id. at 491.
225. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
226. Id. at 103.
227. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
228. Id. at 533–37.
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disclosure tort. One commentator observed: “Given the narrow class of information that fulfills the Florida Star requirements, the tort can no longer be an
effective tool for protecting individual privacy.”229 Another legal scholar wrote:
“The Court paid lip service to the possibility that a private-fact plaintiff may
recover in some cases, but its decisions leave little hope for vindication of such
a plaintiff’s rights.”230
The apocalyptic declarations about the public disclosure tort were probably
inspired by Justice White’s dissent that the Court’s decision would “obliterate
one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of the
publication of private facts.”231 But these statements were significant exaggerations, as the Supreme Court repeatedly reiterated that its holding was very
narrow. In fact, the privacy torts by and large survived the First Amendment
challenges and remain viable torts, even though they are infrequently invoked.232 Nevertheless, a number of commentators view the privacy torts as not
very successful because it is very difficult for plaintiffs to prevail under them.233
And the privacy torts have struggled when addressing emerging privacy problems in the Information Age, such as the collection, use, and disclosure of
personal data by businesses.234
Despite these limitations, the impact of Warren, Brandeis, and Prosser on
American privacy law should not be minimized. The privacy torts are recognized in nearly every state, and Warren and Brandeis influenced the growth of a
tremendous body of law beyond torts. Their conception of privacy as protecting
the dignity of the individual has formed the backbone of privacy law in the
United States. As David Leebron notes, Warren and Brandeis spoke of privacy
229. Jacqueline K. Rolfs, The Florida Star v. B.J.F.: The Beginning of the End for the Tort of Public
Disclosure, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1107, 1128.
230. Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1195, 1207 (1990).
231. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
232. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 988–89 (2003) (arguing that the Court has constitutionalized the
newsworthiness test, requiring heightened scrutiny for restrictions on disclosures of public concern but
expressly leaving open the question about the level of scrutiny for restrictions on disclosures of private
concern).
233. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in
Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1125 (2002) (“In hindsight, it looks as if the Warren and
Brandeis idea of privacy—protection from the despicable nosiness of the media—never got much past
the starting post; and is now effectively dead.”); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal
Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2388 (1996) (describing the invasion
of privacy tort as “alive, but on life support”); Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of
American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289, 289–90 (2002) (“If privacy law were a stock, its
performance over the last century would not be deemed impressive.”). But see John A. Jurata, Jr.,
Comment, The Tort That Refuses To Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private
Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 490 (1999) (claiming the invasion of privacy tort “may be on the
verge of a significant comeback”).
234. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); Richards, supra note 9; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases
and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001).
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as a general legal right, not merely as a tort law protection.235 Indeed, Warren
and Brandeis mentioned other remedies to protect the right to privacy—criminal
law and injunctive relief.236 In 1891, just a year after the Warren and Brandeis
article was published, the “right to be let alone” found its way into constitutional law. The Supreme Court held in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,237
that a court could not compel a plaintiff in a civil suit to undergo a surgical
examination: “As well said by Judge Cooley: ‘The right to one’s person may be
said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let alone.’”238
In 1928, Brandeis incorporated the “right to be let alone” into Fourth
Amendment law when, sitting as a Supreme Court Justice, he dissented in
Olmstead v. United States.239 Sternly disagreeing with the Court’s conclusion
that wiretapping was not a Fourth Amendment violation, Brandeis wrote that
the “makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the government, the
right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.”240 Brandeis further stated that to protect the right to
be let alone, “every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment.”241 Modern Fourth Amendment law has since drawn
heavily from Brandeis’s ideas, and Olmstead has long since been overruled.
Moreover, both Botsford and Brandeis’s views of Fourth Amendment privacy
were later used by the Court to help fashion the constitutional “right to privacy.”
In Griswold v. Connecticut242 and Roe v. Wade,243 the Court relied on the ideas
first articulated in Warren and Brandeis’s article to articulate the scope of the
constitutional protection of privacy rights. Warren and Brandeis’s conception of
privacy thus did not just influence the privacy torts; it also had a wide-ranging
effect on the law of privacy more generally.244
3. The Breach of Confidentiality Tort
Slighted by Warren and Brandeis and virtually ignored by Prosser, confidentiality had a stunted development in the United States during the twentieth
century, and it still has not fully penetrated into the culture of American privacy
law. In the United States, the breach of confidentiality tort has grown up in the
shadow of the Warren and Brandeis torts. Not only did Prosser overlook breach
of confidentiality, but also in many privacy cases, breach of confidentiality
235. David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort Law, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 807 (1991).
236. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219.
237. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
238. Id. at 251 (quoting COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS FIRST EDITION, supra note 31, at 29).
239. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
240. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
241. Id.
242. 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
243. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
244. See Richards, supra note 9, at 1104–07.
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could have been an option but often was not explored. Breach of confidentiality
remained ignored and underdeveloped while the Warren and Brandeis torts
enjoyed the spotlight. Although the tort of breach of confidence has seen some
development in recent decades, it remains in a relatively obscure and frequently
overlooked corner of American tort law.
Only in the past few decades has the breach of confidentiality tort begun to
take on more prominence. In 1982, Alan Vickery suggested in a student note
that remains the leading scholarly work on the tort that “courts are just
beginning to formulate an adequate common law remedy for unconsented
disclosures of personal information in breach of confidence.”245 A 1992 comment by Michael Harvey argued that the “breach of confidence tort has experienced a recent reemergence in American common law.”246
A plaintiff can establish a breach of confidence action by proving the
existence and breach of a duty of confidentiality. Courts have found the
existence of such a duty by looking to the nature of the relationship between the
parties, by reference to the law of fiduciaries, or by finding an implied contract
of confidentiality.247 Most commonly, the breach of confidentiality tort applies
to physicians.248 Courts have also applied it to banks,249 hospitals,250 insurance
companies,251 psychiatrists,252 social workers,253 accountants,254 school offi-

245. Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1426
(1982).
246. G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of Privacy,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2396 (1992).
247. Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of
Privacy, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 20–25 (1995).
248. See Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Mass. 1985) (“We hold today that a duty of
confidentiality arises from the physician-patient relationship and that a violation of that duty, resulting
in damages, gives rise to an action sounding in tort against the physician.”).
249. See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961) (“It is implicit in the
contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that no information may be disclosed by the bank or
its employees concerning the customer’s or depositor’s account, and that, unless authorized by law or
by the customer or depositor, the bank must be held liable for breach of the implied contract.”).
250. See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (“[A]n independent tort
exists for the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information
that a physician or hospital has learned within a physician-patient relationship.”).
251. See Ingram v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (“When in
possession of medical records shielded by the physician-patient privilege, an insurance company has a
special confidential relationship with its insured—a fiduciary relationship—and from that relationship
flows a duty to protect those medical records from unauthorized disclosure.”).
252. See Saur v. Probes, 476 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (“The first issue presented is
whether a cause of action exists for a psychiatrist’s disclosure of privileged communications. We hold
that such a cause of action does exist.”).
253. See Harley v. Druzba, 169 A.D.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“[C]ommunications to be
fostered in the social worker/client relationship are confidential and . . . plaintiff is entitled to invoke the
privilege of professional confidence, a breach of which is actionable as a tort even though it arises from
a contractual relationship.”).
254. See Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (“It is
implied in every contractual relationship between an accountant and his client that a general duty exists
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cials,255 attorneys,256 and employees.257 Some courts have held that liability
under the breach of confidentiality tort also extends to “a third party who
induces a breach of a trustee’s duty of loyalty, or participates in such a breach,
or knowingly accepts any benefit from such a breach.”258
According to David Elder, the “clear modern consensus of the case law” is to
recognize the breach of confidentiality tort.259 Despite the development and
growth of the breach of confidentiality tort on the American side of the Atlantic,
the American tort remains much less developed than its English cousin. As one
commentator observed:
The paucity of breach of confidence cases was probably due to the rise of the
private-facts tort following Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s seminal
1890 Harvard Law Review article . . . . Most jurisdictions accepted Warren
and Brandeis’s argument alleging the inherent superiority of the “broader”
right to privacy approach to privacy protection, and the breach of confidence
cause of action fell into a period of dormancy.260

The American breach of confidentiality tort has yet to come close to reaching
its fullest potential. The tort still applies only to a limited set of relationships,
with most cases involving the patient-physician relationship. Moreover, thirdparty liability for inducing or benefiting from breaches of confidentiality has
only been recognized in a few cases. Having only recently gained momentum,
the breach of confidentiality tort often has not been raised in many cases where
it might have relevance.261
B. PRIVACY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN

The story of privacy in Britain serves as an interesting contrast to the
American experience. English law, like American law, also developed a law of
“private” information. As in America, this English strand of the common law
also traces its origins back to Prince Albert v. Strange. Yet where American law,
not to make extra-judicial disclosures of information acquired in the course of their professional
relationship, and that a breach of that duty by an accountant may give rise to a cause of action.”).
255. See Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 228 (N.Y. D. Ct. 1971) (“Although the
relationship of a student and a student’s family with a school and its professional employees probably
does not constitute a fiduciary relationship, it is certainly a special or confidential relationship.”).
256. See Rich v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882) (“When such duty
grows out of relations of trust and confidence, as that of the agent to his principal or the lawyer to his
client, the ground of the duty is apparent, and the tort is, in general, easily separable from the mere
breach of contract.”).
257. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he tort
[breach of duty of loyalty] applies when the employee breaches her employer’s confidences.”).
258. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio 1965); see also Biddle
v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999).
259. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 5:2 (2006) (writing in the context of physician and therapist
confidentiality duties).
260. Harvey, supra note 246, at 2398–99.
261. We discuss some examples in Part II.C, infra.
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guided by Warren and Brandeis, focused on the intellectual property part of the
opinion, English law has focused on the breach of confidence part. English
courts flatly rejected Warren and Brandeis’s right to privacy, and created a
separate body of law they referred to as “confidence” or “confidentiality.” As
one leading English study of the law of confidence puts it, an obligation of
confidentiality will attach “whenever information is imparted, either explicitly
or implicitly, for a limited purpose. . . . The obligation of confidence thus
formed extends not only to those confidants who have received confidential
information . . . but also to any third parties to whom the confidant discloses the
information in breach of his obligation.”262
The English law of confidence is quite different from the American law of
privacy. Consider the case of Barrymore v. News Group Newspapers, Ltd.263
Actor Michael Barrymore had a homosexual affair with Paul Wincott, who
worked for a company Barrymore jointly owned with his wife. Wincott provided details of the affair to a newspaper, including letters written by Barrymore. The court held that there was a breach of confidence: “[W]hen people
enter into a personal relationship of this nature, they do not do so for the
purpose of it subsequently being published in The Sun, or any other newspaper.
The information about the relationship is for the relationship and not for a wider
purpose.”264
The case of Stephens v. Avery265 provides another illustration of the English
approach. In a case that received widespread publicity in Britain, one Mr.
Telling murdered his wife after he found her in bed with another woman.266 The
plaintiff, Rosemary Stephens, confided in a close friend, Anne Avery, that she
was the then-unknown woman having the sexual relationship with Mrs. Telling.
Stephens expressly told Avery that the information was being disclosed in
confidence. Avery then told this fact to a newspaper which published the
information in an article entitled “Rosemary’s Story.” The court concluded that
Avery breached a duty of confidentiality by telling the newspaper.267 The court
rejected the argument that information loses its confidential nature because a
few others might know about it. If information is “communicated to the world,”
it is no longer confidential, but “this will not necessarily be the case if the
information has previously only been disclosed to a limited part of [the]
public.”268
The results in these cases would very likely be different under American

262. GURRY, supra note 73, at 4.
263. [1997] F.S.R. 600 (Ch.) (U.K.).
264. Id. at 602.
265. [1988] F.S.R. 510. For additional facts, see also JOSHUA ROZENBERG, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS
(2004).
266. Stephens, [1988] F.S.R. at 510.
267. Id. at 518.
268. Id. at 516 (quoting Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), (1998) 2 W.L.R.
805, 868).
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privacy law. Courts might dismiss the cases, either concluding that the information was not private since others knew about it or finding that the information
was “of legitimate concern to the public.”269 Beyond the privacy torts, the
American breach of confidentiality tort would have difficulty because only a
few courts have held that it can make third parties liable for knowingly using
information obtained via a breach. Moreover, the American tort currently has
been applied only to a limited set of relationships; courts have not yet extended
the tort to friends or lovers. In contrast, English law is much more open-ended
in the relationships it protects. As the court in Stephens stated:
Although the relationship between the parties is often important in cases
where it is said there is an implied as opposed to an express obligation of
confidence, the relationship between the parties is not the determining factor.
It is the acceptance of the information on the basis that it will be kept secret
that affects the conscience of the recipient of the information.270

Thus, English common law developed a law of confidence which differs
significantly from the American privacy torts. This section traces how and why
English law took such a divergent path.
1. Origins and Development
In England, Prince Albert v. Strange is considered to be a primary foundation
for the breach of confidence tort. Although breach of confidence cases existed
before,271 Prince Albert became the clearest and most well-known precedent for
the establishment of the tort, in part because of its famous plaintiffs and
interesting facts,272 but also because of its legal importance in establishing that
breach of confidence can be actionable even to third parties.273 After Prince
Albert, the next major development in the breach of confidence tort occurred
just before the First World War. In 1913, in Ashburton v. Pape,274 Edward Pape
sought to use letters between his creditor Lord Ashburn and the Lord’s solicitor
in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Master of the Rolls enjoined the use of the
letters because Pape had tricked the solicitor’s clerk into giving him the
letters.275 The court reasoned that the duty of confidence which ran between

269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). If a disclosure is of legitimate concern to the
public, then a plaintiff cannot prevail under the public disclosure tort.
270. Stephens, [1988] F.S.R. at 517.
271. See supra notes 71–88 and accompanying text.
272. REID, supra note 59, at 9.
273. See GURRY, supra note 73, at 20–21, 48–50; THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA 6–7 (Michael
Tugendhat & Ian Christie eds., 2003); TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 9; LORD CHANCELLOR ’S
OFFICE, SCOTTISH OFFICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, 1972, Cmnd. 5012, at 296 [hereinafter
“Younger Report”] (final report of the “Younger Commission” established by the Labour government in
1970 to study whether Parliament should take legislative action on privacy).
274. (1913) 2 Ch.D. 469 (C.A.) (U.K.).
275. Id. at 472–73.
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lawyer and clerk could equitably be extended to the wrongdoer Pape who was
aware of the confidential nature of the communications.276 As another of the
judges who heard the case put it, such a ruling was fully consistent with the
Court of Chancery’s practice “for many years . . . to restrain the publication of
confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained or of information imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged.”277
Breach of confidence was cemented as a common law action by the seminal
1948 case of Saltman Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co.278 The
court held in that case that “the obligation to respect confidence is not limited to
cases where the parties are in contractual relationship.”279 Saltman established
breach of confidence as a tort remedy separate and apart from contract.280 This
conclusion was affirmed for personal confidences as well in Argyll v. Argyll,281
in which the court clarified that breach of confidence was a remedy in personal
matters, not just commercial ones. There, the court enjoined the Duke of Argyll
from disclosing to reporters his wife’s secrets.282 It reasoned that “there could
hardly be anything more intimate or confidential than is involved in [a marital]
relationship.”283
The English tort of breach of confidence crystallized in the 1969 case of Coco
v. Clark.284 Coco was an action by the inventor of a moped engine against a
moped manufacturer to enjoin the manufacturer’s use of design ideas communicated by the inventor in unsuccessful contract negotiations between the parties.
Although Coco involved a commercial confidence (or what American law
would call a trade secret), it has formed the comprehensive basis under English
law for the analysis of personal as well as commercial confidences.285 Under the
Coco v. Clark formulation for the breach of confidence tort, plaintiffs must
satisfy three elements. First, the information must have “the necessary quality of
confidence about it.”286 Second, the information “must have been imparted in
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.”287 And third, there must
be an “unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party

276. Id.
277. Id. at 475 (opinion of Swinfen-Eady, L.J.).
278. (1963) 3 All E.R. 413 (1948) (U.K.).
279. Id. at 414.
280. See REID, supra note 59, at 12–13; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 16–17.
281. [1967] Ch. 302 (U.K.).
282. Argyll v. Argyll [1967] Ch. 302 (1964). The actual confidences enjoined related to what a
divorce judge had earlier called “disgusting sexual activities to gratify a debased sexual appetite,”
referring to her “infamous sexual liason with a man, generally believed to have been Douglas
Fairbanks, Jr., who was photographed ‘headless.’” ROZENBERG, supra note 265, at 10.
283. Argyll, [1967] Ch. at 322.
284. Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng’rs) Ltd., [1969] R.P.C. 41 (U.K.).
285. See, e.g., ROZENBERG, supra note 265, at 8–9; THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note
273, at 202; Venable v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2001] Fam. 430, 447–48.
286. Coco, [1969] R.P.C. at 47 (opinion of Megarry, J.).
287. Id.
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communicating it.”288
Subsequent cases have fleshed out each of the Coco factors in some detail.
With respect to the first factor of “quality of confidence,” four categories of
information have been protected as confidential.289 Three of these categories—
personal confidences, trade secrets, and artistic and literary confidences—track
the earlier cases fairly well, with the fourth category, government confidences,
being a new but fairly limited category.290 Trade secrets and artistic confidences
have developed along a similar path to the earlier cases discussed above.291 The
only test established for confidences has been a negative one—that the information at issue be neither trivial nor in the public domain.292 Information held to
have the “quality of confidence” about it has included information about health
and medical treatment, information about a person’s sex life or other intimate
relationships, financial information, photographs taken at “private” events, information relating to private letter or telephone communications, the contents of
personal diaries, information about involvement in crime, and information
relating to children.293 Moreover, in cases which have held that a “quality of
confidence” exists, factors relevant to this finding have included the presence of
a contract calling for confidentiality, the intimate or private nature of the
information, actions taken by the confider or confidant suggesting the existence
of confidentiality, and the foreseeable damage caused by disclosure of the

288. Id.
289. GURRY, supra note 73, at 89; THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 205.
290. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Jonathan Cape Ltd. (1976) 1 Q.B. 752, 769–70 (opinion of Widgery,
C.J.) ( “[W]hen a Cabinet Minister receives information in confidence the improper publication of such
information can be restrained by the court, and his obligation is not merely to observe a gentleman’s
agreement to refrain from publication.”); see also THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273,
at 208–13 (noting that the law of confidence applies differently to government secrets because the
government must show that disclosure of a secret would be detrimental to the public interest, whereas
in private cases the party seeking disclosure must show that disclosure would be beneficial to the public
interest); ROZENBERG, supra note 265, at 9–10, 210–216 (noting that the law of confidence applies to the
publication of government secrets learned in confidence).
291. The doctrine of confidence in trade secrets protects economic rights and interests. Determining
what constitutes protected information is highly contextual, but has previously included customer lists,
technical secrets, production methods, financial secrets, prices paid, and business and trading information. The underlying rationale for the doctrine is recognition of the need for secrecy for innovation and
progress, but is balanced against public policy concerns of contract and competition. THE LAW OF
PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 206–08. The more limited doctrine covering artistic and
literary confidences also protects economic rights and interests, but has been limited drastically by the
law of copyright. Literary and artistic confidences have involved etchings, private letters, plots and
ideas for television and stage, political diaries, and drawings. Because of the diversity of possible types
of information involved in these cases, the remedy will generally track the nature of the interest so that
commercial interests may result in damages while privacy interests may require an injunction. Id. at
228.
292. See Gavin Phillipson, Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of
Privacy Under the Human Rights Act, 66 M.L.R. 726, 732 (2003).
293. See THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 213–28; REID, supra note 59, at
142–54; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 38–55, 145–94.
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information.294
The second Coco factor, the imparting of the information under “circumstances importing an obligation of confidence,” goes to the nature of the
relationship that is allegedly confidential. An obligation of confidence is generally created whenever information is given from one person to another for a
limited purpose.295 In addition, third parties who obtain information from a
source who has breached confidentiality can also be liable for using the information. As long as the third party knows that information she has received is in
confidence, she is bound by the confidence even if she received the material
innocently.296 English courts have protected a variety of relationships as involving an obligation of confidence.297 In addition to express contracts of confidentiality and the categories of trade secrets and marital confidences already discussed,
other relationships given an obligation of confidence have included a wide
variety of personal and professional relationships, including lawyer-client,298
patient-doctor,299 employer-employee,300 customer-banker,301 accountant-

294. See THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 228–39; REID, supra note 59, at
30–48; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 19–22, 26–31.
295. GURRY, supra note 73, at 4.
296. Id.; see also Fraser v. Evans, (1969) 1 Q.B. 349, 361 (C.A.) (opinion of Denning, M.R.);
Schering Chems. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd., [1982] Q.B. 1 (C.A.).
297. See generally, GURRY, supra note 73, at 122–76; THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra
note 273, at 248–65; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 145–92.
298. See B. v. Auckland Dist. Law Soc’y, (2003) 2 A.C. 736, 757 (U.K.); R. (Morgan Grenfell &
Co.) v. Special Comm’r of Income Tax, (2003) 1 A.C. 563 (U.K.); see also GURRY, supra note 73, at
149–56; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 183–93.
299. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., (2004) 2 A.C. 457, 499 (U.K.) (opinion of Baroness Hale);
Lady Archer v. Williams, [2003] EWHC (QB) 1670 (U.K.) (holding that medical information is
confidential); R. v. Dep’t of Health, [2001] F.S.R. 8 (C.A.) (U.K.) (holding that pharmacists owe a duty
of confidentiality to those to whom they dispense medication); W. v. Egdell, [1990] Ch. 359 (U.K.)
(physician’s duty); see also GURRY, supra note 73, at 148–49; THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA,
supra note 273, at 214–15; REID, supra note 59, at 145–47; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at
145–56.
300. See, e.g., Faccenda Chicken Ltd. v. Fowler, [1987] Ch. 117(U.K.) (holding that the scope of
employment duties or information determines the scope of confidence); Thomas Marshall (Exports)
Ltd. v. Guinle, [1979] Ch. 227 (U.K.) (recognizing employer-employee confidentiality as well as
contract-based duty); Printers & Furnishers Ltd. v. Holloway, [1965] W.L.R. 239 (U.K.) (recognizing
employer-employee confidentiality as well as contract-based duty); Amber Size & Chemical Co. Ltd. v.
Menzel, (1913) 2 Ch. 239 (U.K.) (recognizing a duty of confidentiality in employment); see also
GURRY, supra note 73, at 179–224; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 171–78.
301. See Tournier v. Nat’l & Provincial Union Bank of Eng., (1924) 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.); see also
Turner v. Royal Bank Scot., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 64 (recognizing the existence of a bank’s duty of
confidentiality known as the “Tournier Rules” although ruling for the bank-defendant); Christofi v.
Barclays Bank Plc., (1999) 4 All E.R. 437 (reaffirming the “Tournier Rules” although ultimately ruling
for the defendant-bank because of a statutory right to information); Barclays Bank Plc. v. Taylor, [1989]
1 W.L.R. 1066 (C.A.) (U.K.) (reaffirming banker-customer confidentiality).
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client,302 fiduciary-beneficiary,303 arbitrator/mediator-litigant,304 government ministers with the government,305 and cases of artistic or literary confidence.306
Courts have not limited the tort to specific categories of relationships. Beyond
marital relationships, for example, courts have extended the tort to lovers and
friends.307
The third Coco factor requires that there be a “detrimental use” of the
confidential information.308 At one level, some sort of injury is generally
required before equity would get involved, but subsequent courts have been
relatively reluctant both to define the requisite level of injury required and even
to state with certainty whether detriment is required as an absolute matter in all
cases.309 Moreover, it may well be, as one case suggested, that the very breach
of a confidence is inherently detrimental, regardless of any proof of damages.310
Even if the three Coco factors are satisfied, the mere existence of a confi-

302. See Parry-Jones v. Law Soc’y, [1969] 1 Ch. 1 (C.A.) (U.K.) (holding that professional
practitioners such as accountants must hold information in confidence); Evitt v. Price, (1827) 57 Eng.
Rep. 659.
303. See Yates Circuit Foil Co. v. Electrofoils Ltd., [1976] Ch. 345, 394 (U.K.) (Whitford, J.)
(noting that a fiduciary relationship is relevant to determining the existence of a duty of confidentiality);
Phipps v. Boardman (1967) 2 A.C. 46 (U.K.) (holding that solicitor to trustees who profited from
information learned in the relationship was a breach of confidence); see also GURRY, supra note 73, at
158–62.
304. See Dolling-Baker v. Merrett, [1990] W.L.R. 1205 (C.A.) (U.K.) (holding that parties to
arbitration are under a duty of confidentiality); Theodoropoulas v. Theodoropoulas, (1963) 2 All E.R.
772 (U.K.) (holding that for mediation of husband and wife reconciliation all parties were bound by
duty of confidentiality).
305. See cases cited supra note 290.
306. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers, [2006]
EWHC (Ch) 522 (U.K.) (granting summary judgment on theories of breach of confidence and
copyright against a newspaper for publication of a private journal that had been leaked by a private
secretary); Ashdown v. Tel. Group Ltd., [2001] Ch. 685 (U.K.) (applying confidence law to protect
political diary); Times Newspapers Ltd. v. Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., [1993] EMLR 443 (U.K.)
(applying confidence law to protect political diary); Talbot v. Gen. Television Corp., [1981] R.P.C. 1
(U.K.) (applying confidence law to an idea for a television series); Floydd v. Cheney, (1970) 1 All E.R.
446 (defendant enjoined from misusing architectural drawings); Pollard v. Photographic Co., (1888) 40
Ch.D. 345, 349 (U.K.) (defendant enjoined from commercially using a portrait taken of plaintiff); Tuck
& Sons v. Priester, (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 629 (U.K.) (court enjoined defendant from printing copies for own
use of a drawing the plaintiff gave to be copied); Gilbert v. Star Newspaper Co., (1894) 11 T.L.R. 4
(U.K.) (recognizing confidence as grounds to restrain publication of the plot of an unreleased play);
Abernethy v. Hutchinson, (1825) 3 L.J. Ch. 209 (U.K.) (holding that publicly delivered lectures could
not be published); Thompson v. Stanhope, (1774) 27 Eng. Rep. 476 (recognizing confidentiality of
private correspondence); see also THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 225, 228.
307. See Stephens v. Avery, (1988) 1 Ch. 449 (U.K.) (friend liable for breach of confidence);
Barrymore v. News Group Newspapers, [1997] F.S.R. 600 (U.K.) (lover liable for breach of confidence). See generally GURRY, supra note 73, at 143.
308. Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng’rs) Ltd., [1969] R.P.C. 41, 47–48 (U.K.).
309. GURRY, supra note 73, at 407; THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 264–65
(collecting cases); TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 70–73.
310. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, (1990) 1 A.C. 109, 265 (opinion of Lord Keith); cf.
Moorgate Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Ltd., (1984) 156 C.L.R. 414, 438 (Australian case cited with
approval in TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 71).
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dence does not mean that courts will protect it under all circumstances.311
English courts have recognized a number of exceptions to an enforceable
confidence, such as consent, information that is trivial or in the public domain,
and information that is in the public interest.312 Two of these exceptions are
particularly relevant here. First, confidences contrary to the “public interest,”
such as those used for tortious or criminal purposes, will not be enforced.313
Thus, in Campbell v. Frisbee,314 supermodel Naomi Campbell was able to
enforce an obligation of confidence against her assistant Vanessa Frisbee regarding information about Campbell’s personal life that Frisbee learned in the
course of her employment, but the obligation did not extend to information
regarding a violent assault that Campbell allegedly made on her employee.315
More generally, English courts have repeatedly made clear that a person cannot
be made “the confidant of a crime or fraud.”316
Second, information in the public domain does not generally qualify for
protection as a confidence.317 The determination of whether something is in the
public domain, however, is a question of degree and “is not to be defeated
simply by proving that there are other people in the world who know the facts in
question.”318 Because a confidence is by definition a sharing of information,
there will always be other people who are aware of the information, and the
question is not whether others are aware of the information but rather whether
so many people are aware of it that it can no longer be said to be a confidence.319 As one court noted, “information only ceases to be capable of
protection as confidential when it is in fact known to a substantial number of
people.”320
Moreover, English confidence law also protects collections of data even
where the individual pieces of data are each drawn from the public domain. As
the court put it in Coco v. Clark:
Something that has been constructed solely from materials in the public
domain may possess the necessary quality of confidence: for something new
and confidential may have been brought into being by the application of the

311. GURRY, supra note 73, at 5.
312. TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 41.
313. GURRY, supra note 73, at 6.
314. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1374 (U.K.).
315. Id.; see also GURRY, supra note 73, at 6.
316. Gartside v. Outram, (1857) 26 L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 113, 114; accord Attorney Gen. v. Guardian
Newpapers, (1990) 1 A.C. 109, 282–283; Lion Labs. Ltd. v. Evans, [1985] Q.B. 526, 550 (C.A.) (U.K.);
Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd. (1973) 1 All E.R. 241, 260 (U.K.).
317. See generally Guardian Newspapers, (1990) 1 A.C. at 282 (opinion of Lord Goff); THE LAW OF
PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 239–41; TOULSON & PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 44–45.
318. Franchi v. Franchi, [1967] R.P.C. 149, 152 (U.K.).
319. See THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 273, at 239–41; Phillipson, supra note
292, at 736.
320. Stephens v. Avery, [1988] Ch. 449, 454 (U.K.).
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skill and ingenuity of the human brain. Novelty depends upon the thing itself
and not upon the quality of its constituent parts.321

As developed under the Coco test, English confidence law evolved into a
robust and flexible body of law protecting personal and commercial information
from disclosure under a conceptually distinct theory from the one undergirding
American privacy law. Rather than information nondisclosure rules justified to
protect the feelings and inviolate personalities of plaintiffs, English law justified
nondisclosure in terms of the trust and reliance in relationships. English law as
it stood in the late 1990s thus protected against betrayal by confidants rather
than embarrassment by strangers. Yet the two separate paths of privacy would
once again begin to converge.
2. The Human Rights Act and the Move Toward “Privacy”
By the late 1990s, the English law of confidence had a very broad scope that
was gradually expanding. Courts had stretched the idea of an obligation of
confidence quite far, interpreting it to include cases where there was not even
any communication between the plaintiff and the recipient of the information,
such as secret photography or wiretapping.322 And third parties have long had
obligations of confidence imposed upon them when they knowingly received
confidential material from the confidant, even where there was no relationship
between the third party and the confider.323 Therefore, in many situations, the
law of confidence could be extended to parties outside the relationship in which
the confidence was initially made. While not as unshackled as a more general
law of privacy might be, the law of confidence had the ability to cover a wide
range of cases.
This flexibility in confidence law was paralleled by a steadfast insistence by
courts and Parliament that English law not recognize a general right to privacy
along American lines. For almost a century, some English commentators had
called for the establishment of a Warren-and-Brandeis-style privacy tort to
supplement breach of confidence. But despite the urging of judges,324 commen-

321. Coco v. Clark, [1969] R.P.C. 41, 47 (U.K.); see also THE LAW OF PRIVACY AND THE MEDIA, supra
note 273, at 207.
322. See Phillipson, supra note 292, at 743 & n.133 (collecting cases).
323. See Ashburton v. Pape, (1913) 2 Ch.D. 469, 472 (opinion of Cozens-Hardy, M.R.); GURRY,
supra note 73, at 269–71.
324. See Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2001] Q.B. 967, 997 (opinion of Sedley, J.) (“[W]e have reached a
point at which it can be said with confidence that the law recognises and will appropriately protect a
right of personal privacy.”); Schering Chems. Ltd. v. Falkman Ltd., [1982] Q.B. 1, 21 (opinion of
Denning, J.) (“Whilst freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, so also is the right of
privacy. Everyone has the right to respect for his private life and his correspondence: article 8 of the
European Convention.”); see also Stephen Sedley, Towards a Right to Privacy, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS,
June 8, 2006, at 20 (lamenting that the House of Lords turned down “a paradigmatic opportunity to
acknowledge a true privacy right” when it denied recovery in Wainwright v. Home Office, [2001]
EWCA (Civ) 2081).
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tators,325 and law commissions326 for stronger protections for confidentiality or
an express right of privacy, Parliament consistently refused to create a statutory
tort.
Courts also consistently refused to recognize an American-style tort in the
common law. The most famous judicial rejection of privacy occurred in the case
of Kaye v. Robertson in 1991.327 The court refused to prevent the publication of
an interview and photographs of a celebrity recovering in his hospital room
from a brain injury. The court noted that the plaintiff suffered “a monstrous
invasion of his privacy” and that “[i]f ever a person has a right to be let alone by
strangers with no public interest to pursue, it must surely be when he lies in
hospital recovering from brain surgery and in no more than partial command of
his faculties.”328 However, the court concluded, “[i]t is this invasion of his
privacy which underlies the plaintiff’s complaint. Yet it alone, however gross,
does not entitle him to relief in English law.”329 By contrast, this fact pattern has
traditionally been an easy case for American privacy law to protect.330
The Kaye principle persisted until recently, a fact best illustrated by the recent
case of Wainwright v. Home Office.331 In January 1997, when Mary Wainwright
and her handicapped son Alan Wainwright were visiting a prison, they were
illegally strip-searched by guards looking for drugs. The Wainwrights brought
an action against the government for, among other things, battery and trespass
to the person. The trial judge granted their claims, holding that the tort of
trespass to the person protected a common law right of privacy. The government
appealed the judgment of trespass, and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding
that the English common law did not include a stand-alone right of privacy.332
The sole remedy for the indignities suffered in this case was the claim of
battery, which protects merely physical and not dignitary injuries. This conclu-

325. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Notes of Cases, Privacy and the Press, 24 M.L.R. 185 (1961); Brian
Neill, The Protection of Privacy, 25 M.L.R. 393 (1962); Seipp, supra note 88; Percy H. Winfield,
Privacy, 47 L.Q.R. 23 (1931); T. L. Yang, Privacy: A Comparative Study of English and American Law,
15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 175 (1966). Numerous commentators have also opposed the creation of an
American-style right of privacy on a variety of grounds. See, e.g., PRATT, supra note 8; ROZENBERG,
supra note 265; see also RAYMOND WACKS, PRIVACY AND PRESS FREEDOM (1995); Raymond Wacks, The
Poverty of “Privacy,” 96 L.Q.R. 73 (1980).
326. Younger Report, supra note 273; LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, BREACH OF
CONFIDENCE, 1981, Cmnd. 8388 [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION REPORT].
327. [1991] F.S.R. 62 (C.A.) (U.K.).
328. Id. at 70.
329. Id.
330. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 392 (“[W]hen [a plaintiff] is confined to a hospital bed . . . the
making of a photograph without his consent is an invasion of a private right, of which he is entitled to
complain.”); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942) (photograph of woman in hospital room
used to illustrate an article about her condition was actionable as invasion of privacy).
331. [2001] EWCA (Civ) 2081, [2003] All E.R. 943 (U.K.).
332. See id. at 57 (opinion of Mummery L.J.) (“This claim fails as there is no tort of invasion of
privacy. Instead there are torts protecting a person’s interests in the privacy of his body, his home, and
his personal property. There is also available the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence for the
protection of personal information, private communications and correspondence.”).
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sion was affirmed by the House of Lords.333
A variety of reasons have been suggested for England’s unwillingness to
protect “privacy,” including an English reluctance to entrust something as
important as privacy to public authorities,334 the power of the media lobby
before Parliament,335 and the reluctance of Parliament to pass such a law for
other political considerations.336 The leading study of privacy in Britain suggests that a large part of the answer lies in the distinctive British appreciation
for privacy that inheres in the national character and thus paradoxically requires
less protection through formal legal rules.337 Whatever the reason, despite the
large number of privacy bills and proposals before Parliament since the 1930s,
the legislature declined to enact a privacy law.338
English law has recently made greater strides toward recognizing an Americanstyle right to privacy. Yet, ironically, this state of affairs has come not from
American legal influences but as a result of British legal involvement with
Europe. In 1998, Parliament passed the landmark Human Rights Act (HRA),339
which came into effect in 2000. The HRA effectively incorporated a Bill of
Rights into English law by requiring that English courts protect the rights
guaranteed by the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). Two provisions of the ECHR have proven significant for English
confidentiality law. Article 8 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and correspondence.”340 Article 10
provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression.”341 The
passage of the HRA has spawned a flurry of cases involving celebrities suing
the media. Although the law remains in a state of flux, English courts responded
to Article 8 not by endorsing a new action for privacy, but by further stretching
the law of confidence. English law responded to Article 10 by holding that
freedom of speech was a factor to be considered in the public interest exception
to the tort.342
One of the earliest post-HRA cases was brought in November 2000, the same
month that the HRA came into effect, by actors Michael Douglas and Catherine

333. Wainwright v. Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] A.C. 406 (U.K.).
334. PRATT, supra note 8, at 206.
335. Gerald Dworkin, The Younger Committee Report on Privacy, 36 M.L.R. 399, 399 (1973).
336. Sedley, supra note 324, at 21.
337. PRATT, supra note 8, at 16, 206–07.
338. One exception to this trend is the Data Protection Act of 1998, which gives effect to the EU
Data Protection Directive of 1995, Directive 95/46 EC of the European Parliament and the Council.
The Data Protection Act prohibits the wrongful processing of personal data. Although the Data
Protection Act has been interpreted as providing privacy protection to individuals, especially against the
media, it has not proven as popular with litigants as the post-HRA breach of confidence tort. For a
discussion of the relationship between breach of confidence and the English Data Protection Act, see
generally HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, MEDIA FREEDOM UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (2006).
339. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42.
340. European Convention on Human Rights, § 1, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950.
341. Id. § 1, art. 10.
342. See Sedley, supra note 324, at 20.
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Zeta-Jones, seeking an emergency injunction against Hello! magazine in order
to protect the exclusive right they had granted to OK! magazine to publish
photographs of their wedding.343 Although wedding guests had been told not to
take any photographs, a photographer eluded security measures and posed as a
guest in a tuxedo to secretly take nine pictures for Hello! magazine. The trial
court granted the injunction. The Court of Appeal vacated the injunction as
unduly restricting freedom of expression, but held that the celebrity plaintiffs
could pursue a claim for damages.344 Lord Justice Brooke reasoned that “it
would certainly be arguable, if the appropriate facts were established at trial,
that ‘unauthorised’ images were taken on this private occasion by someone in
breach of his or her duty of confidence, and that they therefore constituted
‘confidential information.’”345 Lord Justice Sedley went further, making the
case for a right to privacy grounded in existing confidentiality law under
post-HRA English law. He noted that “courts have done what they can, using
such legal tools as were on hand, to stop the more outrageous invasions of
individuals’ privacy; but they have felt unable to articulate their measures as a
discrete principle of law.”346 With the flourish of a pun, he added, “Nevertheless, we have reached a point at which it can be said with confidence that the
law recognizes and will appropriately protect a right of personal privacy.”347
Sedley went on to argue that privacy recognizes “that the law has to protect not
only those people whose trust has been abused but those who simply find
themselves subjected to an unwanted intrusion into their personal lives.”348 He
concluded that the law should no longer have to “construct an artificial relationship of confidentiality between intruder and victim: it can recognise privacy
itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal
autonomy.”349
The Douglas case returned to the trial court and in 2003 Hello! magazine was
found liable in damages.350 Unlike the right to privacy theory sketched out by
Lord Justice Sedley in the Court of Appeal, Justice Lindsay based his judgment
on breach of confidence.351 In the opinion of the court, all three of the Coco
factors were satisfied—there was a quality of confidence because the information about the wedding was inaccessible, there was an obligation of confidence
because the guests knew or should have known of the wishes of the bridal
couple not to have photos taken, and there was detriment because the couple
suffered both emotional and financial distress from the publication of the
343. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd, [2001] Q.B. 967 (2000) (U.K.) [hereinafter Douglas I].
344. Id.
345. Id. at 984 (opinion of Brooke, L.J.).
346. Id. at 997 (opinion of Sedley, L.J.).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 1001.
349. Id.
350. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd, [2003] EWHC (Ch) 786, [182]–[186], [227], (2003) 3 All E.R. 996
[hereinafter Douglas II].
351. Id.
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photographs.352 Although the court noted that the breach of confidence analysis
was affected by the passage of the HRA, it stated that there was still no
free-standing privacy tort under English law.353 Balancing the protection of
Article 8 privacy through breach of confidence doctrine against the Article 10
guarantee of a free press, the court held that Hello! magazine was not insulated
from liability by its status as part of the press because the pictures were taken in
violation of the relevant press code of professional ethics, they were taken by an
impostor posing as a guest via subterfuge, and there was no public interest in
the publication of the pictures, notwithstanding the fact that Hello! readers
wanted desperately to see them.354
Perhaps the leading case on post-HRA English privacy and confidence law is
that captioned as A v. B Plc.355 Garry Flitcroft (A), a Premiership footballer of
limited fame, had extramarital affairs with two women, C and D. He sought and
obtained an interim injunction preventing the People newspaper (B) from
publishing stories by C and D about his affairs. The injunction was set aside by
the Court of Appeal, in which Lord Woolf, the Lord Chief Justice, sat with two
other judges.356 In his opinion for the Court, Lord Woolf attempted to bring
some order to the confusion surrounding the intersection between HRA privacy
and traditional breach of confidence law. At the outset, he declared that such
cases should appropriately be resolved through the existing doctrinal mechanism of breach of confidence, and that the creation of a new privacy tort would
be unnecessary.357 Nevertheless, given the number of post-HRA lawsuits, Lord
Woolf attempted to provide some “guidelines” to trial courts dealing with such
cases in the future. Lord Woolf explained that although courts should safeguard
privacy through confidentiality, they must be wary of enjoining the press
because of the importance of protecting freedom of the press. Even in the
absence of a public interest in the news article, injunctions against the press in
the name of privacy must be “justified.”358
Nevertheless, the opinion significantly broadened the scope of the breach of
confidence tort to include American-style privacy actions, holding that
the need for the existence of a confidential relationship should not give rise to
problems as to the law. . . . A duty of confidence will arise whenever the party

352. Id. at 1045, 1053–54.
353. Id. at 1061–62.
354. Id. at 1055.
355. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337, [2003] Q.B. 195 (U.K.).
356. Id. at 218.
357. Id. at 205–06 (“It is most unlikely that any purpose will be served by a judge seeking to decide
whether there exists a new cause of action in tort which protects privacy. In the great majority of
situations, if not all situations, where the protection of privacy is justified . . . an action for breach of
confidence now will, where this is appropriate, provide the necessary protection.”).
358. Id.
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subject to the duty is in a situation where he either knows or ought to know
that the other person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected . . . .359

Lord Woolf noted that the free speech rights of the party who wants to gossip
must be balanced against the privacy interests of the party who wants to restrain
the disclosure. The type of relationship at issue would determine the appropriate
balance between privacy and speech. Finally, Lord Woolf cautioned that public
figures should expect lesser-judicially-enforced privacy360 and that the courts
should not attempt to act as “censors or arbiters of taste.”361
Applying these general principles, Lord Woolf concluded A was not entitled
to an injunction. Since A was a “well known premiership football player,” there
was at least a “modicum of public interest” in his off-the-field activities.362
Second, A’s non-marital relationship with C and D would not enjoy the same
level of protection as a marital relationship: “[T]here is a significant difference
in our judgment between the confidentiality which attaches to what is intended
to be a permanent relationship and that which attaches to the category of
relationships which A was involved with here.”363 Nevertheless, the court
concluded that the relationships involved in the case reached the “outer limits of
relationships which require the protection of law.”364 Balancing the lessened
value of confidentiality in this relationship against freedom of the press, the
court concluded that granting an injunction “would be an unjustified interference with freedom of the press.”365
A third leading post-HRA case implicating privacy in the guise of confidence
is Campbell v. MGN Ltd.366 Supermodel Naomi Campbell was photographed
leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, and the photos were used in a tabloid
account of her drug addiction, her attendance at the meeting, and some of the
details about the meetings.367 In ruling that Campbell was entitled to an
injunction, the Law Lords concluded that there is no free-standing right of
privacy in English law but that the HRA requires the expansion of breach of
confidence law to include invasions of privacy.368
Campbell, A v. B Plc, and Douglas are the leading, but by no means the only,
post-HRA cases that suggest the movement of English confidence law towards
recognizing a right to privacy in virtually all but name. The captions of other

359. Id. at 207.
360. Id. at 208.
361. Id. at 209.
362. Id. at 217 (“Footballers are role models for young people and undesirable behaviour on their
part can set an unfortunate example. . . . [T]he fact is that someone holding his position was inevitably a
figure in whom a section of the public and the media would be interested.”).
363. Id. at 216.
364. Id. at 217.
365. Id.
366. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373, [2003] Q.B. 633 (U.K.).
367. Id. at 650.
368. Id. at 661; see also Sedley, supra note 324, at 4.
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cases read like a “who’s who” of modern British celebrity.369 Some of the fact
patterns of these cases—photographs of the interior of a home, and the reports
of domestic details—bear a striking similarity to the paradigmatic cases foreseen by Warren and Brandeis over a century ago.370 These cases are significant
not only because they signify the possible broadening of the common law
breach of confidence tort, but also because they demonstrate that the new
English privacy cases are grappling with the same tension between the disclosure of private facts and freedom of expression that have plagued analogous
actions in the United States.
Thus, the English law of confidence seems to be in the midst of a transmogrification, as the passage of the HRA has caused that venerable tort to give birth
to an implicit new law of privacy. As Raymond Wacks notes, under current
English law,
[i]t is unnecessary to show a pre-existing relationship of confidence where
private information is involved. A duty of confidence will arise whenever the
party subject to the duty is in a situation where he either knows or ought to
know that the other person can reasonably expect his privacy to be protected.371

Likewise, Joshua Rozenberg observes: “The need for a formal relationship
between two parties has become attenuated almost to the point of nonexistence.”372 These changes in the law of confidence have led another to
declare that “[t]he time has come to say openly that there is a right to privacy in
English Law.”373 Nevertheless, despite muddying the conceptual waters, English courts are enlarging the already expansive breach of confidence tort to
encompass many of the harms redressed by the American right to privacy.
The English experience is instructive, for it demonstrates how the concept of
confidentiality can develop into a powerful protection of personal information.
369. In addition to the reported case denying radio and television presenter Jamie Theakston’s
attempt to prevent publication of reports of his activities in a brothel, see Theakston v. MGN, Ltd.,
[2002] EWHC (QB) 137, [H2], a number of unreported cases have involved lawsuits by: Victoria “Posh
Spice” Beckham to keep nude photographs of herself out of the newspapers, see Phillipson, supra note
292, at 722–27; Posh and her husband David Beckham to prevent photographs of their mansion
“Beckingham Palace” from being published, Beckham v. MGN, June 28, 2001 (Eady, J) (unreported),
cited in Phillipson, supra note 292, at 727; ROZENBERG, supra note 265, at 26; Cherie Blair to prevent
the publication of the “details of her domestic arrangements,” Blair v. Associated Newspapers, No.
HQ0001236, (unreported), cited in Phillipson, supra note 292, at 727; and radio disc jockey Sara Cox
to prevent the publication of nude sunbathing pictures of her and her husband on their honeymoon, Roy
Greenslade, Sara Cox Wins Key Human Rights Ruling Against Press, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 7,
2003, at 1.
370. See cases cited supra note 369.
371. Raymond Wacks, ‘Private Facts’: Is Naomi Campbell a Good Model?, 1 SCRIPT-ed 420, 426
(2004), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue3/wacks.asp.
372. ROZENBERG, supra note 265, at 15.
373. James Strachan & Rabinder Singh, The Right to Privacy in English Law, 2002 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 129, 161.
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Warren and Brandeis rejected confidentiality as too restrictive and narrow a
basis for protecting privacy, but they did not envision just how flexibly the
concept could be used.
C. CONTRASTING CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY

Examining the paths of the common law of privacy on both sides of the
Atlantic reveals at least three critical differences in theory and practice. First,
there is a profound contrast between the underlying conceptions of privacy in
American and English tort law. These contrasting conceptions of privacy result
in the law asking very different questions and in producing significantly distinct
results. Second, a number of the doctrinal limitations that have restrained the
privacy torts—including the publicity and newsworthiness elements—are inapplicable to actions for breach of confidentiality. Third, the First Amendment
critiques that have limited the privacy torts in the United States would have
much less force when applied to breaches of confidentiality. In this section, we
explore these conceptual and practical differences between the two common
law conceptions of privacy.
1. Conceptual Differences
Most fundamentally, the conceptions of privacy underlying English and
American privacy tort law are radically different. Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy is highly individualistic. Their central phrase to describe the
right to privacy—the right to be let alone—emphasizes the isolated individual
and her ability to shut out invaders.374 To be fair, Warren and Brandeis recognized the negative social effects of the rampant rise in gossip,375 but they based
the right to privacy on protecting the individual and not social relationships.
They gave short shrift to the extent to which personal information arises within
human interaction and is transmitted between people with various expectations
of confidentiality.
Today, many conceptions of privacy in American law are defined in very
individualistic terms.376 One court declared: “Privacy is inherently personal.
The right to privacy recognizes the sovereignty of the individual.”377 Prosser’s
Second Restatement of Torts provides similarly that “[t]he right protected by the
374. See SOLOVE, supra note 234, at 93–97.
375. Gavison, supra note 6, at 441.
376. A group of scholars has begun to attack the individualistic conception of privacy, arguing that
privacy is “constitutive” of society. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy
and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1428 (2000); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations
of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989) (privacy
“safeguards rule of civility that in some significant measure constitute both individuals and community”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L REV. 1609, 1613 (1999);
Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 709 (1987)
(“[P]rivacy considerations no longer arise out of particular individual problems; rather, they express
conflicts affecting everyone.”); Solove, supra note 9, at 488.
377. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
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action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the individual
whose privacy is invaded.”378 Thomas Emerson argues: “Generally speaking,
the concept of a right to privacy attempts to draw a line between the individual
and the collective, between self and society.”379 Edward Bloustein, a leading
defender of the privacy torts, argued that individual dignity was the unifying
theme behind the privacy torts.380
In contrast to Warren and Brandeis’s individualistic conception of privacy,
the English law of confidentiality focuses on relationships rather than individuals. Far from a right to be let alone, confidentiality focuses on the norms of trust
within relationships. Indeed, most of our personal information is known by
other people, such as doctors, spouses, children, and friends, as well as institutions, such as ISPs, banks, merchants, insurance companies, phone companies,
and other businesses. We need to share our secrets with select others, and when
we tell others a secret, we still consider it to be a secret. We confide in others,
we trust them with information that can make us vulnerable, and we expect
them not to betray us. These norms are missing from the Warren and Brandeis
conception of privacy.
The key conceptual difference between the breach of confidence tort and
public disclosure of private facts tort is the nature of what is protected. The
public disclosure tort focuses on the nature of the information being made
public. By contrast, the focus of the tort of breach of confidentiality is on the
nature of the relationship. As one scholar has put it, “while the private-facts tort
focuses on the nature of the information published, the breach of confidence
action focuses on the parties’ obligations to each other.”381 In many public
disclosure cases, courts have struggled in recognizing that information shared
with other people can still be private.382 “Privacy” has often been understood to
mean total secrecy.383 Confidentiality is more nuanced, as it involves the
sharing of information with others and the norms by which people within
relationships handle each other’s personal information.
In applying the American privacy torts, many courts find that information is
not private because it is shared with others or exposed in some way to the

378. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I cmt. a (1977).
379. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 545 (1970).
380. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 (1964).
381. Gilles, supra note 247, at 10; see also Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The
HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 652–58 (2002) (contrasting breach
of confidentiality with public disclosure).
382. American Courts have reached highly inconsistent results about this issue. Compare Duran v.
Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (telling a few people extinguishes privacy
claim), with Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556 (Ct. App. 1988) (telling a few
people “does not render private information public”). For an innovative analysis of this issue from a
social networks theory perspective, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy,
72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).
383. See SOLOVE, supra note 234, at 42–44.
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public.384 For example, in Nader v. General Motors Corp.,385 the court concluded that information “already known to others could hardly be regarded as
private” and that if a person shares information with others, “he would necessarily assume the risk that a friend or acquaintance in whom he had confided might
breach the confidence.”386 Confidentiality stands directly at odds with the
notion that when people share information with others they necessarily assume
the risk of betrayal. The very purpose of confidentiality law is to recognize and
enforce expectations of trust.
2. Doctrinal Differences
In some circumstances, English breach of confidence law protects personal
information in ways that resemble the American right to privacy. Confidentiality
and privacy protect related interests, and there is substantial overlap between
them. But there are significant doctrinal differences between breach of confidence and the privacy torts that can have a real impact on the outcomes of
cases.387 First, the American privacy torts have often struggled when applied to
the disclosure of personal data by businesses. Several privacy torts—intrusion
upon seclusion, public disclosure, and false light—require that the information
being publicized must be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”388 Many
disclosures of personal information do not meet this high hurdle. This is
especially true with disclosures of personal data by companies, since the
revelation of information about one’s home address, finances, and shopping
habits might not strike many as deeply embarrassing or humiliating.389 The
breach of confidentiality tort does not contain a “highly offensive” requirement,
as it views the injury not exclusively in terms of the humiliation caused by the
revelation of information but also in terms of the violation of trust between the
parties. As one court explained, whereas the public disclosure tort “focuses on
the content, rather than the source of the information,” the breach of confidentiality tort focuses on the source and protects confidential information “without
regard to the degree of its offensiveness.”390
Second, the element of “publicity” provides an additional restriction on the
public disclosure tort that the breach of confidentiality tort lacks. In order for a
public disclosure to be actionable, the disclosure must be widespread. As the
Restatement commentary declares, “it is not an invasion of the right of privacy
. . . to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single

384. See Solove, supra note 9, at 534.
385. 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
386. Id. at 770.
387. For a discussion of some of these distinctions, see GURRY, supra note 73, at 14; TOULSON
PHIPPS, supra note 78, at 112–16; WACKS, supra note 325, at 57–59 (1995).
388. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D, 652E (1977).
389. See SOLOVE, supra note 234, at 60.
390. McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 438 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
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person or even to a small group of persons.”391 In contrast, a person can be
liable for breach of confidentiality even when information is spread only to a
few others.
Third, the public disclosure tort is also restricted by the newsworthiness
test—the information cannot be of “legitimate concern to the public.”392 The
newsworthiness test has led to many courts extinguishing public disclosure
cases. Courts have struggled greatly in applying the newsworthiness test, with
many courts simply deferring to the media’s judgment, all but precluding a
plaintiff from ever making a successful claim.393 Other courts look to the
“customs and conventions of the community” and only conclude that information is not newsworthy if it consists of “morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake.”394 In addition to the public disclosure tort, the
tort of appropriation has a newsworthiness test of sorts; if a person’s name or
likeness is used to illustrate an “article on a matter of public interest” then there
is no appropriation, even if the photo does not involve the actual people
involved in the matter.395 There is no such limitation on the breach of confidentiality tort.
Although presumably applicable to the use and disclosure of personal information by businesses, the breach of confidentiality tort has rarely been invoked in
this context. It is difficult to know why the tort has not been pled, but one
suspects that the immaturity of the confidentiality tort in America coupled with
the fame of the privacy torts is largely to blame. Nevertheless, in leading
privacy cases, confidentiality has often not been invoked where it would have
been helpful. For example, confidentiality was not pleaded in the Nader case,
even though the plaintiff was suing on a theory that the defendant, General
Motors, was asking his acquaintances details about him.396 Similarly, the privacy torts, and not breach of confidentiality, were asserted in Dwyer v. American Express Co.,397 where American Express peddled information about its
cardholders’ shopping habits to merchants. The court rejected an intrusion upon
seclusion claim because the cardholders “voluntarily” gave their information to

391. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). The requirement of widespread
disclosure is also part of the false light tort. Id. § 652E.
392. Id. § 652D.
393. For example, one court held: “[W]hat is newsworthy is primarily a function of the publisher,
not the courts.” Heath v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1990); see also
Wagner v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 307 F.2d 409, 410–11 (7th Cir. 1962); Jenkins v. Dell Publ’g Co., 251 F.2d
447, 451–52 (3d Cir. 1958). For a general discussion and critique of deference to the press, see Solove,
supra note 232, at 1001–08.
394. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977).
395. Finger v. Omni Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 141–42 (N.Y. 1990); see also Arrington v.
N.Y. Times, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1332 (N.Y. 1982); Delan ex rel Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608,
613 (App. Div. 1983).
396. See Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (App. Div. 1969); Nader v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 292 N.Y.S.2d 514, 515–16 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
397. 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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American Express.398 The court also rejected an appropriation claim because
“an individual name has value only when it is associated with one of defendants’ lists.”399 In a breach of confidentiality action, whether the information
was voluntarily given to American Express would not be a dispositive factor.
Nor would the monetary value of the information be a critical element. Breach
of confidentiality would look to the expectations created in the relationship
between American Express and its cardholders. And of course, the confidentiality of financial relationships like banker-client has been recognized for some
time.400
Cases where companies violate their privacy policies could also potentially
benefit from breach of confidentiality claims. Consider, for example, two cases
involving Northwest Airlines after a number of carriers disclosed passenger data
in violation of their privacy policies to the federal government after the September 11th attacks. In In re Northwest Airlines Privacy Litigation,401 the court
rejected an intrusion upon seclusion claim by a group of passengers because the
passengers “voluntarily provided their personal information to Northwest” and
because “the disclosure here was not to the public at large, but rather was to a
government agency.”402 In Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp.,403 the court
rejected a breach of contract claim because “broad statements of company
policy do not generally give rise to contract claims” and the passengers failed to
prove damages.404 Disclosing the passenger information is arguably a breach of
confidentiality regardless of whether the privacy policy amounts to a contract.
The widespread disclosure requirement of the disclosure tort would not apply.
And because the theory of liability is different, the theory of damages would
also differ. Instead of contract damages, which compensate primarily for financial losses, the remedy for breach of confidentiality would compensate for any
kind of harm resulting from the breach of trust.405
Of course, breach of confidence—even in England in the post-HRA period—is not a super-tort. Breach of confidence will not prevail in every case
where the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts fail. Nor should it. Because

398. Id. at 1354.
399. Id. at 1356. Another court reached a similar holding with regard to appropriation for a
magazine that sold its subscribers’ names to a direct mailing company. See Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d
337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
400. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho 1961).
401. 2004 WL 1278459 (D. Minn. 2004).
402. Id. at *5.
403. 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.N.D. 2004).
404. Id. at 1200.
405. Although contract damages generally compensate for economic losses, in special cases they
can sometimes encompass emotional distress. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, ON CONTRACTS §§ 12.1, 12.9,
12.17 (3d ed. 1999). The Restatement of Contracts provides that recovery for emotional distress is
possible if the “breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely
result.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981). In contrast, damages for breach of
confidentiality include a wide variety of harms, including emotional distress, reputational damage, and
more. See DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 5.2 (2001).
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confidentiality requires the existence of a relationship to which it is reasonable
to impose duties of confidence, it will not apply in many cases where the
American privacy torts might. As Warren and Brandeis themselves recognized
over a century ago, breach of confidence is a poor cause of action to assert
against strangers who take and publish nonconsensual photographs of people.
An action for breach of confidence protects information given by the confider to
the confidant, but not information communicated outside that relationship.
Thus, a third party can freely disclose private facts about a person as long as the
third party did not learn the information from a confidant. Although confidentiality can be stretched to include protections against the use of surveillance
devices by third parties,406 such protections come much more naturally to the
American legal conception of privacy.407 But in contexts where a confidential
relationship might exist, breach of confidence asks different and germane
questions about whether duties of nondisclosure might be appropriate, an
inquiry that the American conception of privacy law has often failed to make.
3. The First Amendment Critique
Finally, the First Amendment might apply differently to the breach of confidentiality tort than it does to the disclosure tort. First Amendment law treats with
suspicion broad claims against personally offensive speech that are enforceable
against the world, and holds a special solicitude for press defendants. Viewed in
this light, it is not surprising that Warren-and-Brandeis-style privacy claims
brought against the press to remedy hurt feelings have encountered the First
Amendment with mixed results.408 The Florida Star case supplies a useful
example. In that case, a newspaper that published the name of a rape victim
discovered in the public records was immunized from liability by the First
Amendment. The reporter copied down the inadvertently unredacted name in a
report in the police records room despite knowing that she was not supposed to
do so, and despite sitting near signs “making it clear that the names of rape
victims were not matters of public record, and were not to be published.”409 In a
narrow and fact-specific ruling, the Supreme Court held that three factors were
dispositive. First, the fact that the government disclosed the name to the reporter
(albeit inadvertently) meant that the newspaper had lawfully obtained the

406. See, e.g., Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire, (1995) 4 All E.R. 473 (when telephoto
lenses are used to look into a home, “the law [of confidence] would protect what might reasonably be
called a right of privacy”); Shelley Films Ltd. v. Rex Features Ltd., [1994] E.M.L.R. 134 (Ch.)
(enjoining as a breach of confidence the use of a photo of a costume taken secretly by a photographer
who entered a film studio without permission); see also cases cited infra, notes 409–424.
407. See LAW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 326, at 117–18 (discussing surreptitious surveillance
devices and noting that “to give a remedy merely because information is acquired by one of these
means would amount to the creation of a right of privacy” and stating that “the creation of a general
right to privacy is beyond the scope of even an expanded law of breach of confidence”).
408. See supra notes 217–234.
409. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 546 (White, J., dissenting).
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information.410 Second, because the cause of action against the press took “the
extraordinary measure of punishing truthful publication in the name of privacy,”
strict scrutiny applied.411 In such a posture, the state interests in protecting the
privacy and security of the victim were insufficient where the state had failed to
use the less restrictive alternative of not inadvertently leaking the information.
Third, the court noted some technical problems in the way that the Florida law
was drafted.412
Looking at the Florida Star case from a confidentiality perspective is instructive. The statute in Florida Star provided individual compensation for the
emotional injury stemming from press publication of truthful information. It did
not operate from a relational perspective, enforcing duties of confidentiality
imposed upon reporters as a condition of access to the police files. Indeed, the
Supreme Court seems to have implied that the very reason the newspaper
prevailed was due to the government’s breach of confidentiality with respect to
the name. Thus, the statute was doomed under strict scrutiny because the
government’s breach of confidentiality rendered the reporter’s acquisition of the
name lawful, whereas preventing such breaches in the first place would have
been a substantially less restrictive means to protect the information. Thus, even
Florida Star, arguably the most press-protective Supreme Court case dealing
with privacy torts and the First Amendment, appears to leave room for confidentiality.413 In a subsequent case, Los Angeles Police Department v. United
Reporting Publishing Corp.,414 the Court held that if the government is not
constitutionally required to make certain information publicly accessible, the
government may impose conditions on those desiring to access it.415 There is
nothing to bar confidentiality from being one of these conditions. Moreover, in
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,416 the Court held that protective orders, which
mandate confidentiality of information received in discovery, do “not offend the
First Amendment.”417
There is additional support for the proposition that existing First Amendment
law is far more comfortable with enforcing nondisclosure rules in the context of
relationships, even those involving the press.418 For example, in Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co.,419 the Supreme Court concluded that a reporter’s promise to

410. Id. at 536–37.
411. Id. at 537, 540.
412. Id. at 540.
413. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1212 (2002) (arguing
that under the First Amendment, “[g]overnments can make a public record available on the condition
that certain information is not disclosed or used in a certain manner”) (emphasis in original).
414. 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
415. Id. at 40.
416. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
417. Id. at 37.
418. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1149, 1194–1207 (2005).
419. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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maintain the confidentiality of a source could be enforced without running afoul
of the First Amendment: “[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”420 Perhaps as a result,
scholars who have asserted First Amendment concerns with the public disclosure tort have conceded that confidentiality might not have similar problems.421
For example, Eugene Volokh argues that enforcing contractual promises of
confidentiality is “defensible under free speech doctrine.”422 Andrew McClurg
observes: “If one accepts the proposition that a party to an intimate relationship
impliedly agrees not to breach the other party’s confidence by publishing
private, embarrassing information about them via an instrument of mass communication, the speech restriction is one that is self-imposed, rather than stateimposed.”423
Mapping the contours of information nondisclosure rules and the First Amendment is a difficult task, and we do not mean to suggest that confidentiality
solves all of these problems. For example, even if the government can solve the
Florida Star problem by conditioning press access to certain sensitive police
files on an express or implied agreement of confidentiality, other problems
might remain such as the effect on public access to information should such
agreements become ubiquitous and be applied to other areas. Nevertheless,
confidentiality law holds out the potential to be more harmonious with modern
First Amendment jurisprudence than the Warren and Brandeis torts.
***
The breach of confidentiality tort in America in many respects resembles the
traditional English tort. It has similar elements, and it has been recognized to
apply to third parties who induce or benefit from the breach. Yet despite its
significant power, as demonstrated by English law, the American breach of
confidentiality tort often fails to make an appearance in privacy cases even
when it seems to be highly applicable. It has largely remained dormant and
untapped, yet it has the same early foundation in the common law as the English
tort.
More broadly, since American privacy law often remains focused around
individualistic conceptions of privacy, it has not fully embraced protecting
confidentiality in relationships. In many other contexts, such as trade secrets and
business confidences, American law readily provides remedies against unwar420. Id. at 669.
421. See Randall Z. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change,
80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1174 (1992) (“[W]e [should] look to the concept of breach of confidence to
provide legally enforceable protection from dissemination of identified types of personal information.”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 363 (1983) (“[M]ore thought should also be given to increasing
use of legal sanctions for the violation of special confidential relationships.”).
422. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implication of a
Right To Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2000).
423. McClurg, supra note 213, at 938.
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ranted breaches of trust.424 But in the domain of privacy, American law has not
progressed nearly as far as English law in recognizing and protecting trust in
relationships. An increased recognition of a confidentiality-based conception of
privacy might also have significant implications in other areas of American
privacy law that developed under the influence of Warren and Brandeis.
CONCLUSION: THE PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
This Article has explored ways in which confidentiality experienced a late
and limited development in American law but flourished in England. We have
argued that the particular social problem that Warren and Brandeis were confronting led them to abandon confidence as a useful concept, despite its deeper legal
pedigree than a right to privacy. Prosser further exiled confidentiality from
privacy when he excluded it in his formulation of tort privacy. As a result,
confidentiality had a stunted growth in America as it developed in the shadow of
the Warren and Brandeis right to privacy.
In contrast to the rather meagerly developed breach of confidentiality tort in
America, the English tort is quite expansive and is enlarging its territory. Even
before the HRA, the English tort was much broader in scope and much more
mature than the American breach of confidentiality tort. Unlike the American
tort, which thus far has been limited to particular relationships, the English tort
has a more open-ended applicability based upon the expectations of the parties
in any given relationship. Moreover, although the American tort has third party
liability, it has only been used in a few cases. In contrast, the English tort has a
more clearly established principle of third party liability. And English courts are
quite willing to infer breaches of confidence when information has been leaked
to the media. In short, the English law of confidence is far more muscular and
developed than the American confidentiality tort.
It is impossible to know precisely what would have happened had Warren and
Brandeis embraced confidentiality. Would American law have developed similarly to English law? How broad would the American law of confidentiality
have been had Warren and Brandeis chosen to infuse it with their genius and
creativity? How would other bodies of privacy law have been influenced, such
as constitutional law and statutory law? We can only speculate about how the
American law of privacy might have turned out differently.
English law serves as a useful example of an alternative way that the
common law can conceptualize and regulate unwarranted disclosures of personal information. Specifically, one of the lessons that American privacy law
424. For example, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, adopted by over forty states, protects trade secrets
against misappropriation under a theory related to breach of confidence. See Robert G. Bone, A New
Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 247 (1998); Sharon
K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn From Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 667, 687. This should be no surprise since trade secret law is itself a common law cousin to
confidentiality, and in the English common law it is the most common of the four sources of liability
under the breach of confidence tort. See GURRY, supra note 73.
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can draw from the English law of confidence is that not all information
disclosed to others enters the public domain and thereby loses legal protection.425 English law recognizes intermediate states between being completely
private (known only to one person) and completely public (in the public
domain). This is in sharp contrast to American privacy law, which has frequently tended to view the private and the public as binary opposites.426
Moreover, because confidentiality involves enforcing explicit or implicit promises, it does not have the same First Amendment implications as the public
disclosure tort. The broader lesson to be drawn from the divergent paths of
privacy law in America and England is that both American-style privacy and
English-style confidence protect valuable and related interests. As we both have
argued elsewhere, privacy cannot be reduced to a singular essence; it is a
multiplicity of different yet related things that has room for both Warren-andBrandeis-style privacy and English-style confidence.427 Confidentiality is thus a
key dimension of privacy; it cannot be excised from privacy nor can it serve as
the sum and substance of privacy either. Because they protect distinct dimensions of the ways in which unwanted disclosures of personal information can be
harmful, both confidence and American-style privacy are worth protecting.
Recent developments in the law on both sides of the Atlantic suggest that both
American and English law are coming to this realization. English law seems to
be moving towards encompassing privacy at the same time that the American
confidentiality tort is maturing. English law can learn much from the American
privacy torts; and American law has much to learn from the English confidentiality tort. Perhaps with greater recognition, confidentiality will finally take its
place alongside the Warren and Brandeis privacy torts, and the concept of
confidentiality will become better integrated into the legal and conceptual
landscape of American privacy.

425. Phillipson, supra note 292, at 736.
426. See Solove, supra note 413, at 1177 (“The law often treats information in [a] black-and-whitemanner; either it is wholly private or wholly public.”).
427. See e.g., Richards, supra note 9, at 1121; Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1087, 1099 (2002); Solove, supra note 9, at 481–82 (2006).

